Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Volume 7

Issue 1

2017

Making Bureaucracies Think Distributively: Reforming the
Administrative State with Action-Forcing Distributional Review
Kenta Tsuda

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Legislation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenta Tsuda, Making Bureaucracies Think Distributively: Reforming the Administrative State with ActionForcing Distributional Review, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 131 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol7/iss1/5

https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.7.1.making
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA104.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

16-MAR-18

11:02

MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK
DISTRIBUTIVELY: REFORMING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE WITH ACTIONFORCING DISTRIBUTIONAL REVIEW
Kenta Tsuda*
ABSTRACT:
This Article proposes that agencies analyze the distributional impacts of major regulatory actions, subject to notice-and-comment procedures and judicial review. The proposal responds to the legitimacy crisis that the administrative state
currently faces in a period of widening economic inequality. Other progressive
reform proposals emphasize the need for democratization of agencies. But these
reforms fail to address the two fundamental pitfalls of bureaucratic governance:
the “knowledge problem”—epistemic limitations on centrally coordinated decision
making—and the “incentives problem”—the challenge of aligning the incentives
of administrative agents and their political principals.
A successful administrative reform must address both problems. Looking to
the environmental context, this Article proposes adapting the approach taken in
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) to confront the contemporary administrative legitimacy crisis. It considers a hypothetical “Distributive
Impacts Review Act,” explaining what the statutory scheme would look like and
detailing how it would work. The Article concludes by reflecting on potential
distributional review’s appeal both to the progressive egalitarians, and to champions of efficient government.
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INTRODUCTION
When the populist wave crashed over the United States in 2016, the
Trump, Cruz, and Sanders campaigns did not frequently mention administrative agencies.1 Instead, ire was directed at legislators, the more visible
faces of the governing elite. Populists often coupled attacks with proposed
reforms of campaign-finance law or restrictions on permissible forms of
congressional lobbying. The Trumpian slogan “drain the swamp,” for exam1.
See PHILIP WALLACH, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S L EGITIMACY
CRISIS 30 (2016) [hereinafter WALLACH, L EGITIMACY CRISIS] (describing the Trump, Cruz, and
Sanders campaigns as populist forces engaged in a “great civil war, testing whether American
representative democracy uneasily coupled with a powerful technocratic administrative state
can long endure.”). The Cruz campaign did offer some criticism of the administrative state
in advocating a return to a government conforming to the “constitutional framework.” Id.
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ple, was originally interpreted by pundits as a call for lobbying reform.2
Perhaps because most Americans are unfamiliar with the structure of the
administrative state and the nature of its day-to-day activities,3 if the government required “draining,” it was not the halls of bureaucracy that voters
had in mind.
But a legitimacy crisis of the status quo is necessarily a legitimacy crisis
of the administrative state: “[o]ur governments are . . . essentially bureaucracies.”4 A developing movement of progressive administrative lawyers has
observed such a legitimacy crisis.5 In response, reformers are rethinking
administrative institutions and contemplating institutional fixes to make
government more responsive to the citizenry. This Article assesses some of
those reform proposals. It points out what they miss about the nature of
bureaucracy, and why this matters. It then makes a novel institutional proposal to address government perpetuation of societal inequities, which lies
at the root of populist discontent. The proposed statute would require agencies to prepare a distributional analysis of all major regulatory actions, subject to notice-and-comment procedures and judicial review.
The Article begins by recognizing the structural limitations on bureaucracy as a form of governance, while simultaneously recognizing the importance of accepting and improving the administrative state. The possibility of
improving the decisions of bureaucratic organizations is apparent from the
environmental movement. Drawing on the example of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), this Article proposes adapting the
NEPA approach to respond to the distributional inequities underlying contemporary populism by making bureaucracies think distributively.6
In what follows, Part I describes the development of progressive reform
proposals responding to the legitimacy crisis of the federal administrative
2.
See Isaac Arnsdorf et al., Will ‘Drain The Swamp’ be Trump’s First Broken Promise?,
POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-drain-swamp-pro
mise-232938.
3.
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN . L. REV.
411, 412 (2005) (“Because administrative lawyers are intimately familiar with those legal
structures, they realize what many ordinary citizens do not: that nearly every facet of our
modern life is defined by a sprawling, yet poorly understood, regulatory apparatus.”).
4.
Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 673, 676 (2015) [hereinafter Vermeule, Optimal] (“[T]he great flowering of constitutional theory in the late eighteenth century addressed classical institutions, such as elected legislatures and constituent
assemblies, whose importance has diminished over time. Our governments are, to a first
approximation, essentially bureaucracies.”).
5.
See generally K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2016) [hereinafter RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY].
6.
The phrase is a reference to Serge Taylor’s famous study of “the NEPA approach.”
See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984).
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state. It draws on the work of scholar K. Sabeel Rahman7 to describe proposals to democratize administrative decision making. Part II then evaluates
the democratizing approach on the basis of its ability to confront (1) the
“knowledge problem” (epistemic limitations on centrally coordinated administration), and (2) the “incentives problem” (the challenge of aligning
the incentives of administrative agents and their political principals). Part
III presents a more promising approach to reform embodied in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Part IV brings the previous sections together, proposing that the lessons embodied in NEPA can—and should—be
applied to address distributional inequities, the root of the contemporary
legitimacy crisis. After describing the inadequacy of distributional impacts
analysis in extant regulatory practice, it proposes a mandate to the federal
bureaucracy—modeled on NEPA—requiring distributional analysis of all
major federal actions. It then considers the potential advantages of such a
requirement. The Article concludes with some thoughts on the attractiveness of such an approach to diverse political perspectives.
This Article contributes to several literatures that are not as conversant
with one another as they should be. First, it draws upon the literature developed by administrative law scholars and political scientists concerning political control of the federal bureaucracy. Second, it draws on literature about
the origins, theory, and practice of federal environmental law, in particular
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Third, it engages with literature concerned with populist or anti-systemic political forces emerging in
early 21st century advanced industrial societies, and the associated legitimacy crisis of bureaucratic governance. There have been works bringing
together some of these strands—notably the work of Rahman, described
below, which brings together the first and third—but few bring together all
three.
This Article focuses upon a somewhat narrow statutory area—the arcana of NEPA regulatory practice and the voluminous case law concerned
with it—to reflect on more general questions of administrative law, institutional design, and the contemporary politico-legal conjuncture.

I. PROGRESSIVE REFORM OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNMENT
The administrative state has expanded over decades in response to a
rapidly changing society and economic base. But today, emerging populist
movements target the administrative state for reform or even deconstruction. These movements associate the bureaucracy with oligarchic tendencies
observed in early 21st century America. Reformers have proposed to redi7.

RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5.
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rect the regulatory bureaucracy’s substantive goals and to democratize political control over the bureaucracy by transferring decisional authority from
technocrats to lay citizens.

A. The Looming Legitimacy Crisis
Administrative agencies have exercised federal executive power since
almost the beginning of the Republic.8 More recently, “the sheer amount of
law—the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government—made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.”9 For
example, while the 114th Congress passed 329 statutes,10 in 2015 alone federal agencies promulgated 3,410 rules11 spanning 24,694 pages in the Federal Register.12 In past decades, proliferation of regulation has not occurred
in a vacuum. Jurists “as radically dissimilar as Chief Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone and Carl Schmitt” have attributed the pre-dominance of administrative action to changes in advanced industrial society.13 Technology, and
with it society’s economic base, change rapidly, and deliberative legislative
institutions necessarily operate at an ineffectual time lag.14 Government’s
8.
See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1014 (2015)
(“[C]ongressional delegations of rulemaking authority began in the very first Congress. For
example, the twenty-fourth statute enacted in 1789 provided that the government would
continue to pay previously granted pensions ‘under such regulations as the President of the
United States may direct.’ ”).
9.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); see Watts,
supra note 8, at 1014-15.
10.
These figures come from a search of government websites originally undertaken by
Katherine Watts, see Watts, supra note 8, at 1014 n.67, which were updated for this Article:
see Advanced Search, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/advanced-search (set search parameters as “Search in: Legislation: Congress: is: 114 (2015–2016)” and “Search in: Legislation: Status of Legislation: is: Became Law”) (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
11.
See FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER DOCUMENTS ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE 19762015, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2016/10/docs.PercentageChange2015.pdf (last
visited Oct. 6, 2017).
12.
See Regulatory Studies Ctr., Pages in the Federal Register (1936 – 2016), Reg Stats,
GEO. WASH., https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited Oct. 6,
2017). Page lengths might indicate quality rather than quantity of legislation. See also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1624 (2016) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Most Knowledgeable] (“One reason for the great length of final rules is that their
preambles engage with comments, frequently in considerable detail.”).
13.
ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 67 (2016).
14.
ADRIAN VERMEULE & ERIC A. POSNER, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN
REPUBLIC 61 (2010) (“[T]he rate of change in the policy environment is too great for traditional modes of lawmaking”).
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solution has been to allocate discretion to specialist administrative officials
within the executive agencies.15
Today, however, populists question the legitimacy and desirability of
the transition to government by regulation. For example, President Trump’s
early administrative policy has clarified the meaning of “draining the
swamp.”16 Trump’s right-populist movement initially adopted a “deconstructionist” orientation towards the administrative state,17 via appointment
of a political leadership that is either affirmatively opposed to the agencies
it directs or includes figures other than textbook unconflicted technocrats.18
The deconstructionist project concentrates on shifting the federal agencies’
coordination and problem-solving functions to more local authorities or allowing reversion to decentralized coordination by the private law in civil
society. With at least a significant, politically determinative, portion of the
American electorate, the legitimacy of the federal administrative state has
been eroded.19
Frustration with the distributional outcomes of policy making is at the
heart of this process. Americans across the political spectrum increasingly
perceive their economic possibilities as limited and the policies structuring
these possibilities as unfair.20 The United States is perceived as slipping
towards oligarchy, with economic and political opportunities concentrated
15.
Id. at 60 (“[E]xecutive officials take center stage, setting the agenda and determining the main lines of the government’s response, with legislatures and courts offering second-decimal modifications.”).
16.
See Matthew Continetti, Donald Trump’s Team of Outsiders: What Drain the Swap
Really Means, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/442683/don
ald-trump-draining-swamp-will-look-different-people-think.
17.
Max Fisher, Stephen K. Bannon’s CPAC Comments, Annotated and Explained, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/stephen-bannoncpac-speech.html?mcubz=0 (discussing Bannon’s comments that the Administration’s “third
. . . line of work is deconstruction of the administrative state. . . . If you look at these cabinet
appointees, they were selected for a reason and that is the deconstruction.”).
18.
See Meg Jacobs, Opinion, Trump is Appointing People Who Hate the Agencies They Will
Lead, CNN, Dec. 12, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/10/opinions/government-is-theproblem-jacobs/index.html; Eric Lipton, Ben Protess, & Andrew W. Lehren, With Trump
Appointees, a Raft of Potential Conflicts and ‘No Transparency,’ N.Y. TIMES (April 15, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/US/politics/trump-appointees-potential-conflicts-html.
19.
See generally WALLACH, L EGITIMACY CRISIS, supra note 1; Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 719 (2016) (reviewing DANIEL R.
ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940
(2014)) (describing contemporary uneasiness regarding the administrative state’s legitimacy).
20.
See GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 223-73 (2017); WALLACH, L EGITIMACY CRISIS, supra
note 1, at 3-6; BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY 1-3 (2017).
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among the wealthy and powerful.21 The work of social scientists like
Thomas Piketty indicates that the perception of economic polarization corresponds to reality.22 Much of the change is attributable to government,
whether directly or indirectly: Congress has experienced impasse and a potentially untenable fiscal situation for almost a decade; outside of government, the country has experienced low growth, rising inequality, looming
environmental crisis, and other signs of ostensible decline.23 Rather than
counteracting these trends, the administrative state has participated in upward redistributions of wealth and opportunity.24 It is from this predicament—to some extent shared with other advanced industrial societies—that
the United States has experienced the emergence of populist or “anti-systemic”25 political forces of both the right and left.
The populist wave coincides with an ascendant legal-academic and judicial movement that questions the legitimacy of the administrative state on
constitutional grounds.26 Adherents of the movement interpret the federal
Constitution to emphasize its robust protection of property and economic
rights from government intrusion. According to this interpretation, the
Constitution has been “in some sense ‘lost’ or ‘in exile’ ” since the New
Deal era, when courts acquiesced to an expanding Executive.27 The movement seeks either for the Executive unilaterally to retract its administrative
reach or for the judiciary to corral the bureaucracy within the strictures set
21.
See generally SITARAMAN, supra note 20; see also Ganesh Sitaraman, Economic Structure
and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2016).
22.
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2014); see also SITARAMAN, supra note 20, at 223-73.
23.
See generally Nicholas N. Eberstadt, Our Miserable 21st Century, COMMENTARY (Feb.
15, 2017), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/our-miserable-21st-century/, (noting the decline in American economic conditions and quality of life).
24.
LINDSEY & TELES, supra note 20, at 6 (“[G]overnment has contributed actively to
inequality, not just by failing to restrain naturally inegalitarian market forces but by distorting market forces in an inegalitarian direction. The rise of inequality is, to a significant
extent, a function of state action rather than the invisible hand”); Steven M. Teles, The
Scourge of Upward Redistribution, 33 NAT’L AFF. 78, 78-79 (2015) [hereinafter Teles, Scourge]
(describing “inequality generated by public policies that distort market allocations of resources in favor of the wealthy—what we might call ‘upward-redistributing rents.’ ”).
25.
See, e.g., Perry Anderson, Too Frightened to Change a Hated Order, NATION (Mar. 6,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/too-frightened-to-change-a-hated-order/.
26.
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule refer to the movement as “the New Coke” in sarcastic reference to
the legendary 17th century English judge who resisted despotism under the Stuarts. Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015
SUP . CT. REV. 41, 41-42 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, New Coke]; see also Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 398-99
(2015) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian].
27.
Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian, supra note 26, at 402.
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by the Constitution. Until recently, this movement had been dismissed as a
passing phenomenon,28 and recent judicial decisions had dampened its
hopes of imminent constitutional renewal.29 But with changes in the composition of the judiciary that could not have been predicted before the
Trump Presidency, those dismissive conclusions may have been premature.
If it has not already arrived, the legitimacy crisis looms once again.30

B. Progressive Administrative Reformism
While advocates of deregulation and libertarian jurists have long debated the legitimacy of the administrative state—both in functional and
constitutional terms—a number of progressive scholars have joined the debate. Many contributions have been historiological, questioning the historical premises of the libertarian judicial movement.31 Other scholars have
directed efforts not to address the lawfulness of the administrative state, but
to question its legitimacy in the sociological sense of the term,32 rethinking
28.
Id. at 471 (“But for the immediate future, the only significant question is whether,
and how swiftly, libertarian administrative law will be stopped or undone.”); Adrian
Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1553 (2015) (reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINIS TRATIVE L AW UNLAWFUL? (2014)) (“If one [claims] that the administrative state will be essentially unchanged in its large institutional outlines for the foreseeable future and that
administrative law will also, the observation is certainly correct.”).
29.
Sunstein & Vermeule, New Coke, supra note 26, at 42 (discussing Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) and Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads, 135 S.
Ct. 1225 (2015) as “two important decisions in [which] a supermajority of the Court refused
to embrace the New Coke . . . issu[ing] the long-awaited Vermont Yankee II, insisting that
courts are not authorized to add procedures to those required by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . For now, the center holds.”).
30.
See generally JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND L EGITIMACY (1978) (discussing the rise
of the administrative state and how agency structures create concerns about separation of
power and bureaucracy). But compare Adrian Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, CATO UNBOUND, May 9, 2016, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/05/09/adrian-vermeule/what-legitimacy-crisis (“[T]here is no need for even a moderate solution because there is no
demonstrated problem to begin with.”) with Philip Wallach, Our Simmering Crisis, CATO UNBOUND, May 16, 2016, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/05/16/philip-wallach/our-simmering-crisis (“[P]erhaps [Vermeule] thinks that if the people are not revolting, there must not
be a crisis. I may be living in a different world than Vermeule, but recent political developments convince me that a crisis is indeed upon us, if only in simmering form for now. When
three of the four leading vote-getters in the presidential primaries call for dramatic departures from our current way of governing, we should be able to agree that something is
afoot.”).
31.
See Kessler, supra note 19, at 719 (describing a “recent proliferation of scholarly
defenses of the historical pedigree of the administrative state”); see also id. at 772 (discussing
weaknesses of history-based legitimations of the administrative state).
32.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1794-96 (2005) (“Legitimacy can be measured against three kinds of standards that produce
different concepts of legitimacy—legal, sociological, and moral. . . . Legal legitimacy and
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the federal bureaucracy’s institutions and proposing reforms.33 Many of
these proposals involve democratizing agencies, opening up bureaucratic decision making to public participation.34 The result, reformers claim, would
be an improved regulatory response to the needs of the public as well as
renewed legitimacy.
Several of these proposals have been gathered in the work of K. Sabeel
Rahman, who sets proposals within a historically informed critique of the
administrative state. Like other scholars upon whom he draws,35 Rahman
begins with a diagnosis of the administrative state’s legitimacy crisis: there
has been a “confluence of economic upheaval and governmental failure.”36
For Rahman, the legitimacy crisis arises primarily from the government’s
complacency and complicity in what he perceives as inequitable distributions of power. In contemporary America, the distribution of wealth and
economic power results in “domination—the accumulation of arbitrary authority unchecked by the ordinary mechanisms of political accountability.”37
For Rahman, “accumulations of arbitrary authority” take two forms. Visible
instances of “dyadic domination” occur in transactions between market actors with disparate bargaining power or informational resources. Less visible “structural domination” occurs where negative externalities of market
activity—low wages, unemployment, market failures—constrain opportunities and cast an unchecked influence over Americans’ lives.38
The “government failure” Rahman names refers to the administrative
state’s failure to counter and eliminate the two forms of domination.
illegitimacy depend on legal norms . . . . When legitimacy is measured in sociological terms,
a constitutional regime, governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in
a strong sense insofar as the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise
deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward. . . . In the Weberian sense, legitimacy signifies an active belief by citizens, whether
warranted or not, that particular claims to authority deserve respect or obedience for reasons
not restricted to self-interest.”).
33.
See David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1461 (2013) [hereinafter Arkush, Direct Republicanism] (describing “[a]
flurry of interest in regulation has arisen, as well as a near-simultaneous backlash”).
34.
David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
611, 613 (2012) [hereinafter Arkush, Democracy] (“[T]he democracy ideal should command
more attention and energy. . . . [T]he democracy ideal may offer the best path to strengthening administrative legitimacy.”).
35.
See id. at 611-12.
36.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 77.
37.
Id. at 66, 80 (“[T]he problem of the market economy today is more centrally a
problem of economic power, specifically of domination—the concentration of arbitration
power that undermines economic freedom and opportunity for individuals and communities.
This domination can take the form either of concentrated private power of firms, or of the
diffuse structural power of the market as a system.”).
38.
Id. at 80-86.
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Rahman attributes the failure to the administrative state’s “ethos” or “intellectual paradigm” of managerialism.39 Managerialism entails a substantive
commitment to “optimizing the market” and a procedural reliance on technocratic expertise to achieve this optimization and justify agency decisions.40 Rahman dates the governmental failure to a “neoliberal turn in late
twentieth century,”41 which he understands as an ideational phenomenon:
Influenced by the neoliberal “critique,”42 administrators experienced “a discernable shift . . . from the New Deal-era faith in government, expertise and
macroeconomic management to a stance that is more critical of government
economic regulation and more solicitous of the benefits of free markets,
privatization and business interests.”43

1. Substantive Reform: Reclaiming the Goals of Regulation
According to progressive reformers, the administrative state has compromised its substantive goals. In fulfilling statutory directives from Congress, agencies are committed not to take sides in relationships of
domination.44 Instead, bureaucrats interpret their task as neutral “optimization” of the market through the pursuit of efficiency.45 This narrow role
forfeits what reformers consider the proper function of government: “to
check domination [and] prevent unchecked private or systemic power.”46
One proposed corrective from reformers is normatively worded statutory directives, for example, to commit agencies to “counteract domination
. . . and yield outcomes that respond to the public’s needs.”47 As a model,
Rahman points to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau’s directive “to
further the interests of consumers such as by protecting them from ‘unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts and practices.’ ”48 Rather than neutral searches for
efficient legal rules, agencies should undertake “seemingly difficult and morally controversial ‘line-drawing’ ” tasks, defining “socially desirable . . . activities that will be permitted” as well as “socially harmful practices that will
39.
Id. at 32.
40.
Id. (managerialists have “a narrow view of the goals . . . and the means of
regulation”).
41.
Id. at 39.
42.
Id. at 40.
43.
Id. at 39.
44.
See K. Sabeel Rahman, Note, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48
HARV. J. ON L EGIS. 555, 584 (2011) [hereinafter Rahman, Envisioning].
45.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 17-19.
46.
Id. at 117.
47.
Id. at 98. See Rahman, Envisioning, supra note 44, at 580.
48.
Rahman, Envisioning, supra note 44, at 581.
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be restricted in a more categorical fashion.”49 The distributive effects of
legal rules should be used directly to “rebalance political power.”50

2. Procedural Reform: Addressing the Additional
Problem of Technocracy
To bring about substantive changes in administration, reformers also
desire procedural modification. According to the reformers, the administrative state has relied on technocrats since the New Deal era.51 The New Deal
model was tempered by the introduction of the Administrative Procedure
Act’s notice-and-comment process and judicial review. But the APA’s reliance on periodic input by “organic civil society mobilization[s]” is not a
sufficient democratic counterweight to the influence of technocrats.52 The
regulatory state remains governed by a “faith in expertise.”53
Progressive reformers insist that government by “expert-led regulatory
agencies [in the place of] the democratic public” does not result in optimal
regulatory actions.54 “[I]n the face of complexity, and particularly when facing unexpected, contingent, and vague future benefits or uncertain catastrophic risks,” the returns of technical expertise are limited.55 According to
Rahman, benefits to expertise are even more limited in circumstances of
technological and economic change: experts are well-versed in the knowledge of yesterday, but “[s]ocial and political concerns often outpace scientific consensus,” rendering the knowledge obsolete.56 “Regulatory discretion
and judgment are inescapable,”57 Rahman states, but there is “no reason to
think ordinary people are any less capable of responding to evidence and
correcting prior errors than technocrats.”58
In the place of technocratic decision making, Rahman argues that the
state should adopt a directed, participatory approach where decisions are
made directly by members of the public. He advances several institutional
arrangements to this end. One proposal is to subject regulatory decisions to
referenda—possibly online—before final promulgation.59 Rahman also pro49.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 118, 122 (emphasis added).
50.
Id. at 98.
51.
Id. at 44, 114.
52.
Id. at 114-15 (arguing for “a more meaningful form of political power than simply
[the public] providing input to decision-makers”).
53.
Id. at 126.
54.
Id. at 32-33; see also Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 617-18.
55.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 126.
56.
Id. at 99.
57.
Id. at 117.
58.
Id. at 101.
59.
Id. at 113.
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poses the establishment of “deliberative micro-publics,”60 rulemaking bodies
on which lay citizens would wield final decisional authority. Their composition could be set randomly, as in David Arkush’s proposal for administrative
juries.61 Alternatively, a more carefully tailored group of decision makers
could be selected to “promote equality for representation for different social
interests and values identified as important ex ante.”62 Rahman also
presents an idea advanced by Wendy Wagner in which the government
would “creat[e] . . . office[s] dedicated to [these] particular social interests”
within the agencies to ensure that valuable perspectives are represented.63
Experts would still be needed to “provide information, advice, and knowledge as inputs into democratic debate. . .”64 But lay citizens would “hold
sway to check, guide, and channel the use of expert knowledge.”65 Progressive reformers are confident that the regulatory output from these bodies
would be superior,66 and simultaneously would promote the inherent value
of “robust associational life.”67

II. LIMITATIONS

ON

EFFECTUAL BUREAUCRATIC REFORM

A. Coming to Terms with Actually Existing Bureaucracy
To evaluate where and how administrative agencies fail, and how they
can be reformed in practice, it is imperative to return to their historically
situated tasks and the associated practical imperatives.68 Administrative reform addresses not a theory or an ethos,69 but rather a centrally coordinated, million-person organization, issuing innumerable decisions every
60.
Id. at 112-13.
61.
Arkush, Direct Republicanism, supra note 33, at 1494.
62.
Rahman, Envisioning, supra note 44, at 585.
63.
Id. at 577-78; see Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1414, 1414 n.342 (2010) (describing the origins of the idea in
proposals considered in the 1970s).
64.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 100.
65.
Id.
66.
However, even if regulatory product is inferior, Rahman argues that the aim of
such institutions is not merely better policy. See Rahman, Envisioning, supra note 44, at 587.
Reductions in regulatory quality are offset by benefits of civic vivacity and associational ties:
“participation is valuable for more than its epistemic or informational input . . . it is the core
of democratic politics.” Id.
67.
Id. at 586.
68.
Some progressive reformers understate the importance of practical challenges,
treating these are inherently superable. See, e.g., Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 621
(“The principal challenges facing the democracy ideal are matters of practical design . . . . As
a result, it should be possible to make progress toward realizing the democracy ideal in
administration.”).
69.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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day.70 The managerialist model does not correspond to the actually existing
regulatory apparatus. Expert-dominated agencies (as conceived by technocrats like James Landis) were modified early in the postwar period by passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),71 a compromise document
reconciling opponents and proponents of the New Deal,72 which constrained agency personnel by administrative process and judicial review.73
The APA does not afford the public (or micro-publics) decisional authority.
But agencies are legally bound to consider and respond to public comment.
The administrative state has continued to evolve, changing dramatically in
recent decades. Catalyzed by citizen-suit litigation, the courts in the 1960s
and 1970s assumed a prominent role in policing agencies.74 Since the 1980s,
and especially during the 1990s, reigns of control were grasped most forcefully by the presidency.75 Recently, scholars have observed a shift towards a
plebiscitary control of the agencies. In the early 21st century, scholars argue,
the necessary speed for governmental action, the volume of information to
digest, and changes in the problems requiring coordination all increase the

70.
U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., PPA-02502-6/2016, SIZING UP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:
FISCAL YEAR 2015 at 5 (2016).
71.
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2261-62 (2001)
(“The need for expertise emerged as the dominant justification for this enhanced bureaucratic power. James Landis became the principal spokesman for the idea . . . . Expressed in
this form, the idea today seems almost quaint, and even then it provoked strong opposition. . . . This new skepticism toward expertise resulted in dramatic changes in administrative process. . . . The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 . . .
curtailed the sway of administrative officials by subjecting their most important lawmaking
mechanisms—rulemakings and (especially) adjudications—to stringent procedural
requirements.”).
72.
Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian, supra note 26, at 466 (“[T]he APA should be
treated as an organizing charter for the administrative state—a super-statute, if you will—not
because it is a grand statement of principles with a specific ideological valence, but precisely
because it is a compromise document.”).
73.
See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE (2014) (examining how the
bar and the judiciary modified the administrative state in the first half of the 20th century).
But see Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 612-13 (arguing that “the rule of law ideal” has
“little expression in contemporary reform debates and proposals”).
74.
See Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian, supra note 26, at 394-95, 467 (describing
progressive administrative law and its relationship with judicial review); Kagan, supra note
71, at 2265 (2001) (“Going beyond what the APA seemed to require, the federal courts in the
1970s imposed on agencies new rules designed to ensure the meaningful participation in
agency process of all potentially affected interests.”).
75.
Kagan, supra note 71, at 2284-2303 (comparing and contrasting techniques of presidential administration, including OMB review, rhetorical identification of the presidency
with agency actions, and most importantly directives instigating administrative action, and
how changes in technique modified administrative control).
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need for a less-constricted executive discretion.76 These changes are evident
in the broad scope of recent legislative directives as well as in the judicial
deference afforded to the agencies.

B. Discretion as an Ineradicable Feature of Executive Power
One may agree with today’s progressive reformers: it would be wonderful if citizens always provided valuable input on policy problems, if policy
problems were rendered nontechnical, and if the government itself had the
resources and time to close the knowledge gap between citizens and administrative experts on all policy matters. One can set aside the question of
whether most American adults would be willingly commandeered into administrative decision making; they might not mind the commitment.77 But
proposals must face the “practical design” constraints of 21st century
government.78
Executive power necessarily entails discretion.79 Given the speed of
change and complexity of 21st century economic life, administrative specialization is not only understandable, but also necessary.80 It may be that
76.
Vermeule, Optimal, supra note 4, at 676 (“The main reason for the transformation of
our government into an administrative state is that the rate of change in the policy environment . . . the state has been forced, willy-nilly, to speed up the rate of policy adjustment.
And the main speeding-up mechanism has been ever-greater delegation to the executive
branch”); see generally VERMEULE & POSNER, supra note 14 (examining the concentration of
power in the executive and arguing that the executive faces fewer structural barriers to policy
implementation).
77.
Notwithstanding his demands on citizens in a “direct republican” approach David
Arkush points to precisely this problem in “direct democracy” proposals. Arkush, Direct Republicanism, supra note 33, at 1492 (“The models may over-assume the interest of ordinary
citizens in the administrative process. They also fail to respond adequately to the resource
constraints that stymie meaningful participation by many citizens (not just financial resources but also education and free time).”). But see Cuéllar, supra note 3, at 468-69
(“[I]ndividual members of the public routinely participate, often sending in the vast majority
of the comments, producing both form letters and distinctive contributions, and in all the
three case studies raising concerns that were appropriate for the agency to consider given its
legal mandate. . . . Members of the lay public make up the substantial majority of participants in notice and comment proceedings in the regulations I studied.”).
78.
Cf. supra note 68 and accompanying text; Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 621.
79.
Vermeule, No, supra note 28, at 1558, 1560-62 (describing theory accepted in American case law, legislative and executive practice since Grimaud v. United States that “[s]o long
as agencies are guided by an ‘intelligible principle,’ they are exercising executive power, not
legislative power, even when they issue binding commands. . . . The theory is that it is an
indispensably executive task to ‘fill in the details’ of statutes with binding regulations.”).
80.
Id. at 1613 (“Much of the time, the central political debates in the United States
and abroad turn, above all, on the facts. If the facts can be sorted out and agreed on, the
likelihood of disagreement will diminish dramatically.”); Sunstein, Most Knowledgeable, supra
note 12, at 1608-10.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA104.txt

Fall 2017]

unknown

Seq: 15

Making Bureaucracies Think Distributively

16-MAR-18

11:02

145

“there is no reason to think ordinary people are any less capable of responding to evidence and correcting prior errors than technocrats.”81 Indeed, an
“ordinary person” educated and immersed in the technical details of a problem could become an expert. But that is not a basis for sidelining experts.
Expertise and administrative discretion are especially valuable and necessary when the non-specialist lacks time to play catch-up with rapid changes
in society.
Reformers concede that democratization proposals cannot eliminate executive discretion.82 But their proposals do not embrace this position. The
proposal of administrative juries demonstrates the problem. In this proposal, originally advanced by David Arkush, and adopted by Rahman, randomly selected groups of citizen laypersons decide binary or multiplechoice questions that determine a policy decision.83 The juries convene online, with agencies monitoring via webcams or prompts, “requiring feedback
at regular intervals to ensure adequate attention.”84 An administrative lawyer realizes that rulemakings or other policy choices seldom consist of discrete binary or multiple-choice questions. Therefore, Arkush proposes that
“the most promising approach” would be for agency staff to define the alternatives available, select the criteria for choosing between them, and present
juries with a simplified questionnaire with these choices already made.85 In
fact, it may even be necessary for administrative experts to narrow the list
of questions posed, given constraints of time and attention.86 Even then,
Arkush “does not suggest that juries are fit to play a role in every type of
administrative decision.”87 Presumably administrators would make that
choice too. As in other democratization proposals, the fundamental necessity of discretionary decisions cannot be eliminated from executive power.
81.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 101.
82.
Id. at 117 (“Regulatory discretion and judgment are inescapable.”); see Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 619.
83.
Arkush, Direct Republicanism, supra note 33, at 1504 (“Examples of binary choices
include an up-or-down vote on an agency proposal or, preferably, an important element
within it.”).
84.
Id. at 1501.
85.
Id. at 1502, Id. at 1504 (“Administrative juries can have a role in rulemakings . . . so
long as they are given narrow, discrete matters to decide.”); Id. at 1496 (“[T]he agency completes as much of the technical work as possible . . . . It then narrows the issues, making
whatever decisions it believes are compelled by its statutory mandate and the scientific evidence . . . but it leaves one or more significant discretionary decisions unresolved.”).
86.
Id. at 1504 (“Some rulemakings are highly complex . . . . A jury need not be
presented with every policy question in this type of rulemaking; it should be presented with
one or more discrete matters, preferably ones that can be framed as binary choices, multiplechoice questions, or a range of possibilities.”).
87.
Id. at 1521.
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C. Two Problems with Bureaucracy
Because of the necessity of discretion, any reform of the regulatory
state must come to terms with the two characteristic challenges endemic to
bureaucratic decision-making.88 These are the knowledge and incentives
problems.

1. The Knowledge Problem
The first problem is a structural limitation on the capacity of centralized organizations—like the administrative agencies and the federal executive as a whole—to gather, process, and respond to information regarding
the activity or problem to be regulated. Whether these problems are market
exchanges or environmental harms, the dispersal of information and the
need for localized knowledge—some of which does not exist in ready, accessible, and transferable form—limits administrative agencies to at best rough
approximate knowledge of what is happening.89 Recognition of the knowledge problem is often equated with a deregulatory or libertarian political
orientation. This connection is not necessary: the knowledge problem is of
paramount importance for everyone involved in social life, including nonlibertarians. The upshot is not that centrally coordinated activity (like regulation) should never occur, but that there may be tasks to which it is better
and worse suited.90
To choose between addressing a social problem through centrally coordinated regulation or ceding the ground to private ordering is to consider a
tradeoff, not perfect solutions. Bureaucracy offers the benefit of synoptic
coordination and energetic response, albeit on the basis of partial knowledge; private ordering might in some cases occur on the basis of more localized (albeit not necessarily better) knowledge, but without the synoptic
coordination or dynamism of the unitary actor.91 The assumption that the
superior choice in this tradeoff is always decentralized (spontaneous or
emergent) ordering is incorrect. In many cases, coordination problems will
88.
See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM . ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
89.
This insight is explained by F. A. Hayek in his seminal 1945 paper, “The Use of
Knowledge in Society.” Hayek, supra note 88.
90.
Id. at 521 (explaining that the choice “depends on whether we are more likely to
succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge which ought
to be used but which is initially dispersed among many different individuals, or in conveying
to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their
plans in with those of others . . . the position will be different with respect to different kinds
of knowledge”).
91.
Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State, in LAW,
LIBERTY AND STATE: OAKESHOTT, HAYEK AND SCHMITT ON THE RULE OF LAW 313 (David Dyzenhaus
& Thomas Poole eds. 2015) [hereinafter Vermeule, Local and Global].
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arise in which the benefits of centralized organization outweigh the costs of
inferior knowledge.92 After all, not all spontaneous orders are good ones.93
Thus, there are circumstances in which private ordering cannot succeed due
to coordination problems and negative externalities.94 The response to the
knowledge problem is not that the administrative state should be deconstructed, but rather that the political system must exercise judgment regarding what kinds of tasks a bureaucracy is assigned.95
Progressive reformers call for administrative agencies to overcome the
knowledge problem through democratization. For example, Rahman argues
that “[t]he same knowledge-aggregating properties that Hayek attributed to
the decentralized market as a mechanism for decision-making may well be
present in democratic decision-making, since each individual can register his
own impressions through the democratic process.”96 Though the argument
is not wholly novel in other areas of reform thinking,97 it has been an increasingly prevalent argument in administrative law scholarship.98
92.
See Andrew Gamble, Hayek and the Left, 67 POL . Q. 46, 51 (1996) (“Catallaxies
cannot be relied on to solve all problems. . . . Particular crises, such as famines, wars or
environmental catastrophes, demand the speed of response that a made order can provide.
Problems of public goods and externalities often cannot be easily handled within catallaxies,
and may require more direct government intervention.”).
93.
ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 35 (2008) (“The Tragedy of the
Commons is a spontaneous order, just a bad spontaneous order that produces a structured
social pattern of depletion and waste.”) [hereinafter VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS].
94.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 38-39 (1944) (“There are . . . undoubted
fields where no legal arrangements can create the main condition on which the usefulness of
the system of competition and private property depends: namely, that the owner benefits
from all the useful services rendered by his property and suffers for all the damages caused
to others by its use. . . . [S]ome method other than competition may have to be found to
supply the services in question. . . . [Among these are] certain harmful effects of deforestation . . . some methods of farming . . . the smoke and noise of factories . . . . “).
95.
As Andrew Gamble puts it, “the real issue is to ensure that government is making
use of both [spontaneous] and made orders in order to tackle the problems it faces effectively.” Gamble, supra note 92, at 51.
96.
K. Sabeel Rahman, Conceptualizing the Economic Role of the State: Laissez-Faire, Technocracy, and the Democratic Alternative, 43 POLITY 264, 283 (2011) [hereinafter Rahman,
Conceptualizing].
97.
Other post-Marxist intellectuals had advanced this argument—to similar effect. See
infra note 103—in the 1990s, see HILARY WAINWRIGHT, ARGUMENTS FOR A NEW L EFT: ANSWERING
THE FREE-MARKET RIGHT 41-110 (1994); SIMON GRIFFITHS, ENGAGING ENEMIES : HAYEK AND THE
L EFT 69-94 (2014) (describing Wainwright’s engagement with the knowledge problem).
98.
Rahman seems to have been the first among administrative legal scholars to advance the argument. See, e.g., Rahman, Conceptualizing, supra note 96, at 283; Vermeule, Local
and Global, supra note 91, at 305 (“The market is just one possible institutional mechanism for
generating and then aggregating local knowledge.”) (citing Rahman, Conceptualizing, supra
note 96, at 283); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Knowledge Problem, 9 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t., Working Paper RPP-2015-03, 2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Knowledge Problem] (“In the modern era, regulators are in a far better position to collect
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The democratization proposal merely transfers the problem of dispersed information and the need for aggregation and synthesis. In order to
factor into a policy decision, information dispersed throughout the administrative state would have to be aggregated and processed within the mind of
a single decision maker. The result is what Adrian Vermeule has described
as the “epistemic bottleneck.”99 The wider the net cast by the regulators, the
more extensive the volume of information received, the more dramatic the
bottleneck problem.100 In practice, the real costs of this problem may be
evident in what Wendy Wagner describes as “filter failures”: administrative
officials are inundated with huge quantities of data that they cannot possibly process, digest, and factor into administrative actions.101 Technological

the dispersed information of the public. . . . Democratization of the regulatory process,
through the comment process, has an epistemic value. It helps to collect dispersed knowledge
and to bring it to bear on official choices.”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840 (2013) (“OIRA helps to
collect widely dispersed information—information that is held throughout the executive
branch and by the public as a whole. OIRA is largely in the business of helping to identify
and aggregate views and perspectives of a wide range of sources both inside and outside the
federal government.”); Sunstein, Most Knowledgeable, supra note 12, at 1623–24 (“OIRA often
urges [agencies] to think . . . that the role of the comment process is to learn . . . . It is not
much of a stretch to see the inspiration for this form of deliberative democracy in Friedrich
Hayek, and especially his emphasis on the dispersed nature of knowledge in society. . . .
[H]is work on widely dispersed information has helped inspire the effort to go outside of
government and learn from what others know.”).
99.
VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS, supra note 93, at 50 (“The judgments of many
minds may be the input to a decisionmaking process, but if the structure of that process
requires or allows few minds to accept or reject the many-minded judgment, or even just to
interpret it, then the resulting decision may be little better than if the one mind had simply
decided for itself, right from the start.”).
100.
The knowledge problem would also apply where the agency selects representative
members of the public or relevant “underrepresented” interest groups to serve on a decisional
“micro-public” body. Rahman never explains how an official would know ex ante (as opposed
to decide unilaterally) which members of the public have relevant information. See Kagan,
supra note 71, at 2267–68 (describing similar risks in the context of negotiated rulemaking, in
which “the agency establishes a negotiating committee thought to represent all affected interests and charges it with reaching consensus on the terms of a rule.”).
101.
See Wagner, supra note 63, at 1353-62.
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improvements, efficient processes, and smarter regulators undoubtedly
help.102 But they cannot eliminate the knowledge problem.103
Democratization proposals need to reckon with this inherent limitation
of bureaucracy. In terms of epistemic improvements to regulation, aspirations should be more modest. Public participation can—and does—mitigate
aspects of the knowledge problem, but it cannot eliminate them. For example, APA rulemaking procedures serve several purposes, foremost an epistemic one. Provided that notice is sufficient, and that parties with knowledge
have incentives to participate, the APA’s § 553 procedures can help the bureaucracy gather information from civil society, mitigating the knowledge
problem as much as is possible.104

2. The Incentives Problem
The second limitation on bureaucracy is the “incentives problem,” the
challenge in aligning bureaucrats’ incentives with their democratically determined directives.
Many scholars construe the relationship between agencies and the political branches as a variety of the principal-agent problem.105 Due to the
102.
Sunstein discusses the e-rulemaking procedures implemented by the Obama White
House during his tenure as Administrator at OIRA as an example of the democratization of
regulation, though he concedes that even with such improvements participatory openness
“might fail to solve the knowledge problem.” Sunstein, Knowledge Problem, supra note 98, at
8-10 (“We have now entered the age of e-rulemaking, thanks in part to Executive Order
13563, issued by President Obama in 2011 and serving as a kind of mini-Constitution for the
regulatory state. . . . [E]ven in its most ambitious forms . . . the public comment process
might fail to solve the knowledge problem”).
103.
For a corresponding treatment of Wainright’s theory, see John Meadowcroft, Book
Review, 29 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 429, 431 (2016) (reviewing SIMON GRIFFITHS, ENGAGING ENEMIES : HAYEK AND THE L EFT (2015)) (“For all Wainwright’s engagement with Hayek’s ideas, it is
apparent that she failed to understand the fundamentals of his epistemology.”).
104.
As Cass Sunstein puts it, “[i]t would be extravagant to contend that notice-andcomment rulemaking can eliminate the knowledge problem, even in the modern era, but it
can produce a great deal of help.” Sunstein, Knowledge Problem, supra note 98, at 17; see also
Gamble, supra note 92, at 49 (“The logic of Hayek’s approach—even if he himself does not
always follow it through—is that there should be constant efforts to reform organizations to
allow the specialized knowledge held by each individual to be utilized in the way in which
decisions are taken.”).
105.
See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243 (1987) (“[P]olitical control of agencies is a
principal-agent problem”); Kagan, supra note 71, at 2246 (“The history of the American administrative state is the history of competition among different entities for control of its
policies.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675 (1992) (“[T]he executive and Congress are
involved in a healthy, ongoing tug of war over control of administrative agencies.”); J.R.
DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1443, 1487 (2003) (“[M]embers of Congress compete with each other, over time, to
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breadth of subject matters to which they must attend, elected officials must
entrust details of policy to specialists within the agencies, either by legislative directive or by top-down delegations of power within the executive.106
As in other such relations, incentives of principals and agents can diverge,107
and, because there is an informational asymmetry regarding the subject of
regulation, the divergence can go undetected and uncorrected.108
Other alignment failures can emerge.109 One of these is regulatory capture, the subversion and appropriation of the regulatory apparatus by regulated entities.110 Progressive reformers largely focus on this problem,111 but
they might overemphasize the phenomenon’s importance. Scholars agree
that capture is less pressing a problem today than it was in the early postNew Deal era.112 Indeed, with “the deregulation of the older forms of regucontrol delegated power. This places agencies in the uncomfortable position of having to
respond to multiple legislative principals, whose preferences do not always align.”); see generally Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency
Rulemaking, 88 TEX L. REV. 441 (2010).
106.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 257 (“Delegation of authority makes it possible
for agencies to adjust policies in directions desired by political leaders as more information is
obtained. But this is only a possibility, not a certainty.”). Max Weber, Bureaucracy, reprinted
in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 232-33 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds.
& trans., Routledge 1991) (1948) (“The political master finds himself in the position of the
‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert’, facing the trained official who stands within
the management of administration.”).
107.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 247.
108.
Id.
109.
See id. at 247 (“[S]everal consequences can emerge from this situation. . . . shirking
. . . . corruption . . . . oligarchy: the peculiar political preferences of the agency override
democratic preferences.”); see also Macey, supra note 105, at 672 (“The problem facing Congress can be described as bureaucratic drift, which refers to changes in administrative agency
policies that lead to outcomes inconsistent with the original expectations of the legislation’s
intended beneficiaries.”); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 105, at 1455 (“At a minimum, the
perception of drift is pervasive.”).
110.
See Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAP TURE 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013) (“Regulatory capture is the result or
process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away
from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and
action of the industry itself.”); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short
Inglorious History, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 49, 53-54 (Daniel Carpenter & David
Moss eds., 2013) [hereinafter Posner, Regulatory Capture] (“[T]he term regulatory capture, as
I use it, refers to the subversion of regulatory agencies by the firms they regulate. This is to
be distinguished from regulation that is intended by the legislative body that enacts it to
serve the private interests of the regulated firms”) (emphasis omitted).
111.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 126 (discussing efforts to address regulatory
capture); see Arkush, Democracy, supra note 34, at 620-21.
112.
See, e.g., Posner, Regulatory Capture, supra note 110, at 53-54 (“As a result of the
deregulation movement, which began in the late 1970s mainly as a reaction to the economy’s
dismal performance in that decade . . . . [n]ew regulatory agencies were springing up to

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA104.txt

Fall 2017]

unknown

Seq: 21

Making Bureaucracies Think Distributively

16-MAR-18

11:02

151

lation and the rise of newer forms that are less susceptible of being (fully)
captured, regulatory capture is no longer at the forefront of analysis.”113 To
the extent that it is a problem, the capture of concern may not be traditional
capture by regulated interests.114 Bureaucratic institutions suffer from other,
more nefarious misalignments of incentives, like torpor.115 The principals
controlling the state no doubt would prefer it otherwise, but the informational asymmetry between the political leadership and the bureaucrats make
the problem almost impossible to eliminate:116 only agency officials know
whether a slow tempo results from difficult, time-consuming work or torpor.117 The bureaucracy’s capacity for foot-dragging was highlighted after
enforce [ ] economy-wide or sector-wide regulatory programs . . . . The surviving regulatory
programs have considerable public support, and because the programs are not comprehensive
regulations of the competitive activities of specific industries . . . it is more difficult for the
firms subject to the regulation to organize intense and focused efforts at capture. . . . The
goal of business in dealing with the newer forms of regulation is to weaken regulation, not to
make it a servant of business.”); Sunstein, Knowledge Problem, supra note 98, at 11
(“[A]cademic observers wildly overstate the role of interests groups”).
113.
Posner, Regulatory Capture, supra note 110, at 54-55.
114.
See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 105, at 1501 (describing a “sub-majoritarian
difficulty” in congressional oversight of agencies in which “individual committee members,
acting without the approval of a congressional majority, might divert an agency from its
legislative mandates”); Wagner, supra note 63, at 1362-72 (describing “information capture”);
James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 71,
78-79 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013) (describing “cultural capture”).
115.
Kagan, supra note 71, at 2263 (“[B]ureaucracy also has inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia and torpor.”); Posner, Regulatory Capture, supra note
110, at 51 (describing the problems of “ossification” and agency stagnation). But see Sunstein,
Most Knowledgeable, supra note 12, at 1609 (“If officials do not proceed on one task, their
inaction might, in the abstract, seem objectionable or even scandalous. But the action might
not be a product of neglect or dereliction, but rather of scarce resources and a belief that
other tasks deserve priority. The real question might involve timing, and those in the executive branch are in a unique position to see why (and how) timing is important. . . . Government faces a constant bandwidth problem, and observers—focused on just one of a large
number of issues—suffer from ‘bandwidth neglect.’”). For example, the GAO studied EPA
rulemakings from May 31, 2008 to June 1, 2013: during this period, of the 32 major rules
promulgated, 9 resulted following settlements of deadline suits, “finalized between about 10
months and more than 23 years after the applicable statutory deadlines.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-34, ENVIRONMENTAL L ITIGATION: IMPACT OF DEADLINE SUITS ON EPA’S
RULEMAKING IS LIMITED 9 (2014).
116.
See Weber, supra note 106, at 234 (“The absolute monarch is powerless opposite the
superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert . . . . All the scornful decrees of Frederick the
Great concerning the ‘abolition of serfdom’ were derailed, as it were, in the course of their
realization because the official mechanism simply ignored them as the occasional ideas of a
dilettante.”).
117.
There may be a tradeoff between the speed of administrative action and the extent
to which the knowledge problem can be mitigated. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483–84 (1997) (“Articles lamenting the recent ‘ossification’ of
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the recent inauguration of Donald Trump, with reports of civil servants
subverting government policy through intentional foot-dragging and smallscale sabotage.118

D. Addressing the Knowledge and Incentives Problems
with Political Control
While elected representatives are disciplined at the ballot box, bureaucrats are insulated from direct democratic checks.119 Moreover, elected officials are incapable of comprehensively monitoring agency activity and
disciplining non-compliance.120
Further directives to agencies are unlikely to remedy the situation.121
Progressive reformers have sought to insert “the question of the social value
. . . at the center of the regulatory question” in order to “motivate regulatory
approaches that . . . can help prevent social harms.”122 But legislation already includes the broad directives that these reformers desire. A closer
look would indicate why: such language may in some instances be attractive
because it is so open to interpretation, allowing for directives where Congress “could not reach agreement on specifics, given limited time and diverse interests” or allowing legislators “to pass on to another body politically
difficult decisions.”123 An agency official tasked with discerning how he or
notice and comment rulemaking seem to be the fashion in administrative law scholarship
today. The term ‘ossification’ refers to the inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs
because of analytic hurdles that agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules. To a large
extent, developments in administrative law over the past two decades that were meant to
expand public participation and influence in administrative decision making have unintentionally put these hurdles in place.”).
118.
See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Eric Lichtblau, ‘A Sense of Dread’ for Civil Servants
Shaken by Trump Transition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/
11/us/politics/a-sense-of-dread-for-civil-servants-shaken-by-trump-transition.html?mcubz=1
(reporting on the basis of interviews with federal agency staff); Juliet Eilperin et al., Resistance from Within: Federal Workers Push Back Against Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017) https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/resistance-from-within-federal-workers-push-back-against
-trump/2017/01/31/c65b110e-e7cb-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.5a3dd8cd
3590.
119.
McCubbins et al. supra note 105, at 247.
120.
Id. at 243 (“[T]he possibility arises that bureaucrats will not comply with [elected
officials’] policy preferences.”).
121.
Id. at 272.
122.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 126 (“By putting the question of the social
value of finance at the center of the regulatory question, we can motivate regulatory approaches that rely not on sporadic technocratic oversight or minimalist regulation, but instead on structural changes that can help prevent social harms . . . .”).
123.
Kagan, supra note 71, at 2255-56; see also DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 105, at
1452 (“[W]hy does Congress delegate? The reasons, according to political scientists, are
many. First, as a body, Congress lacks the requisite information or expertise to make

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA104.txt

Fall 2017]

unknown

Seq: 23

Making Bureaucracies Think Distributively

16-MAR-18

11:02

153

she would go about pursuing “the public’s needs,124 or the interests of “main
street” and or the “middle class,” would have innumerable interpretations at
his or her disposal. The indeterminacy problem is equally applicable to the
organizing concept of the burgeoning civic republican reformism:
domination.125
The American federal state has ex post monitoring and correction controls to supplement organic directives, but these too are insufficient. For
example, the President oversees the bureaucracy and its regulatory output
via review by the Office of Management and Budget.126 He or she also
wields the removal power as a stick to punish runaway bureaucrats, and can
organize their activity via directives.127 Congress retains the ability to punish agencies via legislation.128 Congress can also use the Congressional Review Act to excise particular regulatory output and potentially foreclose
substantially similar rules.129 “Nevertheless, by itself, a system of rewards
and punishments is unlikely to be a completely effective solution to the
control problem. This is due to the cost of monitoring, limitations in the
range of rewards and punishments, and, for the most meaningful forms of
rewards and punishments, the cost to the principals of implementing
them.”130
Where the government chooses to use centralized coordination instead
of decentralized private ordering, procedural innovations can render bureaucracy more accountable and informed, especially when coupled with juthousands of specific decisions. Second, the transaction costs of coming to agreement on
contentious issues are high. Third, delegation ‘expand[s] the scope of politically relevant
activity available’ to political actors. Finally, members wish to avoid responsibility for hard
decisions with political costs.”).
124.
RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 98.
125.
See id. at 124; see also, e.g., Philip Petit, The Domination Complaint, 46 NOMOS 87, 94
(2005) (“Domination . . . is not an on-or-off condition but one to which a person may be
subject at higher or lower degree of intensity.”).
126.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 272 (“Substantive legislative specificity is a
substitute for monitoring and punishment as a means of assuring bureaucratic compliance. In
a large, complex government operating in a world of economic, technical, and political uncertainties, and subject to shifting coalitions of questionable stability, widespread practice of
substantive legislative specificity is as impractical as widespread use of monitoring and
sanctions.”).
127.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also Kagan, supra note 71, at 2293-94,
2298.
128.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 248 (“Appropriations and reauthorization bills
also provide a means for either general or programmatically targeted rewards and
punishments.”).
129.
5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012).
130.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 249.
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dicial review.131 “[P]rocedures can be used to mitigate informational
disadvantages faced by politicians in dealing with agencies,”132 preventing
the agencies from “secretly conspir[ing] against elected officials by presenting them with a fait accompli”133 while retaining the flexibility necessary for
administration.134 Procedures can also “enfranchise important constituents
in agency decision-making processes, thereby assuring that agencies are responsive to their interests” by creating opportunities for their input into the
formulation of policy.135 The most obvious example is the procedural structure of the APA’s provisions for notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review of final agency actions Though some have argued that the APA
enthrones another undemocratic ruler in the place of the bureaucrat—
namely the lawyers and judges who employ procedure to jockey over policy136—the APA at root is “written to enhance [democratic] political control” of the bureaucracy.137

E. Successful Reform without Ideological Blinders
Successful administrative reform cannot ignore the knowledge and incentives problems. The progressive left has resisted acknowledging
problems inherent in bureaucracy, likely because of an oversimplified dismissal of its initial observer, F.A. Hayek.138 Today Hayek is “generally only
131.
Id. at 272 (“Administrative procedures can be viewed as an ‘indirect’ means by
which politicians, in anticipation of judicial encroachment, use the courts to maintain political control.”).
132.
Id. at 244, 255 (arguing that procedures can create a coalition to make durable the
bargain struck at that time of the legislative decision), 264-65 (NEPA as an example of deck
stacking).
133.
Id. at 258.
134.
See id. at 244 (“[P]rocedural controls . . . enable political leaders to assure compliance without specifying, or even necessarily knowing, what substantive outcome is most in
their interest.”).
135.
Id. at 244, 255 (arguing that procedures can create a coalition to make durable the
bargain struck at that time of the legislative decision); id. at 264-65 (describing NEPA as an
example of deck stacking). Participatory process might also aid in allowing less well organized interests to coalesce and participate by virtue of its braking effect on bureaucratic activity. See Macey, supra note 105, at 675-76 (arguing that administrative procedures “create the
sort of delay that can help to even the playing field between relatively diffuse, poorly organized groups, and highly organized, well-financed special interests,” but that the longer delays
generated by judicial review and reversal “can benefit highly organized groups relative to
poorly organized groups because the comparative advantage of the highly organized groups
lies in their ability to retain their cohesiveness over a long period of time.”).
136.
See Kessler, supra note 19, at 770-71.
137.
McCubbins et al., supra note 105, at 256.
138.
Rahman, Conceptualizing, supra note 96, at 272 (“Hayek . . . rejected the viability or
desirability of centralized state control and regulation over the market because of a central-
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studied by his ideological sympathizers” on the political right.139 But
Hayek’s insights on bureaucracy not only can, but also should, be separated
from the 19th-century style laissez-faire governance associated with Hayek’s
politics and his followers’.140
Today’s progressive reformers do not contest the basic liberal governance model, in which the state primarily oversees and sets parameters for
private transactions, which remain the predominant form of economic activity. Though Rahman, for example, bemoans the reigning managerialist governance model’s “commitment to . . . optimizing of markets,” where the “the
self-optimizing mechanisms of the market” are insufficient,141 Rahman’s
proposals are of the same mold. His democratic-watchdog administration
still presides over private economic activity, and does not seize the economic commanding heights. To the extent regulators define legal parameters for any activity outside of the government, they are optimizing the
market.142 Reform proposals thus concede the existing liberal governance
model, but fail to address its fundamental problems.
There are reform paths, however, that can address the problems Hayek
identified.143 A historical example is the National Environmental Policy
Act, emerging from the environmental movement of the 1960s.
ized apparatus like the state can never have the totality of information necessary to make
wise decisions about economic allocations.”).
139.
GRIFFITHS, supra note 97, at 95-120 (discussing Andrew Gamble’s critique of the
left’s reception of Hayekian theory).
140.
The association of Hayek with a strictly deregulatory and laissez-faire policy is not
as straightforward as it may seem. See F. A. HAYEK, LAW, L EGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 3:
THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 55 (1979) (“The assurance of a certain minimum income
for everyone, or a sort of floor below which nobody need fall even when he is unable to
provide for himself, appears not only to be a wholly legitimate protection against a risk
common to all, but a necessary part of the Great Society in which the individual no longer
has specific claims on the members of the particular small group into which he was born.”);
see also, Gamble, supra note 92, at 51 (“Hayek wished to restrict the role of government to a
minimum. However, to the dismay of many libertarians he identified numerous areas where
it was legitimate for the government to have a role.”); cf. David A. Weisbach, Should Legal
Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (2003) (“[R]edistribution
might act as a form of social insurance. Any of us could easily be down and out someday due
to misfortune. Redistribution hedges this risk.”).
141.
See RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 167, 170.
142.
See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J.L. ANALYSIS
121, 125 (2016) (“The differentiation of ‘economic’ and ‘social’ regulation, which began to
appear in the 1970s, is imprecise. Just as utility regulation may be thought of as correcting
the market failure of monopoly, so environmental regulation may be thought of as correcting
the market failure of external costs; just as utility regulation standardizes prices, so health
and safety regulation standardize production methods and product designs.”).
143.
Hayek himself at times articulated the compatibility of a political arrangements
conforming to his diagnosis of the ills of bureaucratic governance and aims of social justice,
for example in his endorsement of a redistributive policy of universal income and effectively

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-1\MEA104.txt

156

unknown

Seq: 26

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

III. NEPA

AS

16-MAR-18

11:02

[Vol. 7:1

BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL

The possibility of improving the decisions of bureaucratic organizations
without deconstructing the administrative state is apparent from the environmental movement.

A. The Environmental Movement as Critique of Bureaucracy
The environmental movement emerged in a “republican moment”144 in
the late 1960s. Two factors were notable in that political conjuncture. First,
the era was marked by prominent environmental degradation. A series of
particularly visible instances of environmental degradation in the late sixties
heightened the desire for centralized regulation of environmental pollution
and destruction.145 Events like a huge fish kill in the Mississippi River,
DDT contamination, the burning of the Cuyahoga River, and the Santa
Barbara oil spill, as well as the documentation and higher visibility of widespread species extinction, brought the problem of environmental destruction from industrial activity to the fore of public consciousness.146
The second factor was that the awareness of an environment under
threat merged with a developing political backlash against administrative
experts in federal agencies.147 Concern about the reliability of agency experts and the extent to which they were protecting the public’s welfare initially arose from scandals concerning the effects of radiation fallout from
nuclear-weapons tests. Various public hysterias followed, notably regarding
a social safety net, see GRIFFITHS, supra note 97, as well as explicitly stating the need for
synoptic centralized regulation to address market failures, such as with industrial pollution
and environmental degradation, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
144.
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
59, 66-67 (1992) (describing the beginning of 1970 as a republican moment, that is, “extraordinary periods when broad segments of the public are intensely involved with an issue,
legislators find themselves in the spotlight, and their positions shift closer to those of the
public at large,” in this case environmental protection).
145.
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 61, 79 (2004) [hereinafter
LAZARUS, MAKING] (“By the 1960s . . . increased public awareness of the potentially catastrophic environmental consequences of certain new technologies and industrial processes
had rendered the finiteness of life on Earth a matter of ongoing concern.”).
146.
Id. at 58-59, 63.
147.
William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO L IMIT IT 30 (Daniel Carpenter & David
Moss eds., 2013); Kagan, supra note 71, at 2264–65; cf. Teles, Scourge, supra note 24, at 88
(describing pollution as a form of upwardly redistributive rent “because it extracts uncompensated benefits from those who pay its costs in the form of despoiled air and water” and
describing the environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s as an “anti-rent-seeking
mobilization”).
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contamination of consumer products and water.148 In some of these situations “the authoritative reassurances of government scientists were proved
false,”149 and the ultimate result was “a gradual discrediting not merely of
individual scientists or agencies, but of the Progressive philosophy of governance itself.”150
The political origin of the environmental movement, often overlooked,
is evident in an often cited founding document of the environmental movement: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.151 The book not only addressed absent
birds and poisoned fish, but also directed a political critique at the administrative state, most notably in Carson’s repeated calls for opportunities for
citizen participation in the regulation of pesticide manufacture and application.152 The book was directed at members of the public, not administrators
or the legislators, but Carson’s political message was more direct when she
was called to testify before the Congress months after Silent Spring was
published.153
Political forces coalesced in the wake of environmental controversies,
seeking a reassertion of political control over the agencies. The political
system in turn responded via Congress154 and then the courts.155 The demo148.
See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 211-21, 238 (2d ed. 2006); LAZARUS, MAKING,
supra note 145, at 58.
149.
ANDREWS, supra note 148, at 212.
150.
Id. at 218.
151.
See RAMACHANDRA GUHA, ENVIRONMENTALISM: A GLOBAL HISTORY 1-9, 69-89 (2000)
(describing the growth of environmentalism and Silent Spring as the founding document of an
environmental age); JOACHIM RADKAU, THE AGE OF ECOLOGY: A GLOBAL HISTORY 75-78 (Patrick
Camiller trans., 2014) (likewise discussing the impact of Silent Spring).
152.
“With an equally revolutionary effect, [Silent Spring] documented the excessively
cozy relationships . . . among government agencies and powerful pesticide manufacturers,
user constituencies, and even scientists beholden to them for research funding.” ANDREWS,
supra note 148, at 217.
153.
See Rachel Carson, Statement of Rachel Carson before the Senate Subcommittee
on Reorganization and International Organizations (June 4, 1963), http://rachelcarsoncoun
cil.org/about-rcc/about-rachel-carson/rachel-carsons-statement-before-congress-1963/.
154.
The federal legislative response in some cases was not dampened by the encouragement of large industrial concerns that valued the predictability of federal level regulatory
schemes. See ANDREWS, supra note 148, at 209 (“[A]s a few leading states and cities began to
toughen their air pollution control regulations . . . key industries themselves acquired a
powerful new interest in obtaining moderate and uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and inconsistent state and local standards.”).
155.
Kagan, supra note 71, at 2265 (“Congress likewise passed a set of statutes providing,
in select areas of regulation, enhanced participatory opportunities. The goal was to put in
place procedures that would create a broadly pluralist system of agency decision making, thus
replicating the process of interest group representation and bargaining thought responsible
for legislation.”). Some of the judicial aspects of this response figure into what Sunstein and
Vermeule describe as the moment of “progressive administrative law.” See infra note 171.
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cratic impetus of the late 1960s and early 1970s produced the institutions of
contemporary “legalistic” environmentalism: the Clean Water Act, Clean
Air Act, and Endangered Species Act. Laws resulted from popular pressure
to constrain agencies by having elected representatives directly define objectives and allowing the public (environmental organizations and academic
experts, but also industry) to hold agencies accountable through public comment and citizen-suit litigation.156

B. The National Environmental Policy Act
The most prominent example of legislation originating in the environmental “republican moment” is the regulatory review regime established
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). NEPA is
the United States’ “basic national charter for protection of the environment.”157 The law emerged from discussions in Congress about the need for
a statute setting a policy for the federal government, committing it to the
protection of the environment. Several proposals were offered, including
the creation of a new agency devoted to environmental protection. But the
proposal that ultimately prevailed was the brainchild of Senator Henry
Jackson of Washington and of Lynton Caldwell, a political scientist from the
University of Indiana.

1. Action-Forcing Under NEPA
Jackson and Caldwell’s idea was to commit existing agencies to procedural steps that would further environmental protection. This was done by
procedures binding agencies to consider and internalize scientific expertise
specifically on the environmental impacts of agency decisions.158 The path
was inspired by previous ad hoc consultations, in which agencies undertook
studies of environmental consequences and decisions changed accordingly.
An early example was the congressionally ordered study of environmental
156.
ANDREWS, supra note 148, at 221, 238; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1287 (1986); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN L AW 1970-1960: THE CRISIS OF L EGAL ORTHODOXY 240-42 (1992).
157.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2017). Regulations promulgated by CEQ to instruct agencies on the implementation of NEPA have helped to define its statutory regime. See also
Oliver A. Houck, Is That All? A Review of the National Environmental Policy Act: An Agenda
for the Future by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 173, 184 (2000) (book
review).
158.
See S. REP . NO. 91-296, at 9 (1969) (“A statement of national policy for the environment—like other major policy declarations—is in large measure concerned with principle
rather than detail . . . . But, if goals and principles are to be effective, they must be capable of
being applied in action. S. 1075 thus incorporates certain ‘action-forcing’ provisions and
procedures which are designed to assure that all Federal agencies plan and work toward
meeting the challenge of a better environment.”).
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impact associated with “Project Chariot”—the Federal Atomic Energy Commission’s proposal to excavate a deep-water port at Cape Thompson, Alaska
by detonating five thermonuclear bombs.159 Rather than establishing an
agency substantively focused on environmental protection, the idea animating NEPA was to commit existing agencies to internalize environmental
protection into their normal regulatory activity.
Under the statute and implementing regulations, an agency proposing a
“major federal action” must assess whether the action could have significant
adverse impacts on the environment.160 If the agency excludes such effects,
it must issue a brief summary of its analysis, called an environmental assessment, and an official finding of no significant impact after notice and comment.161 If it finds potential of significant impacts, the agency must
undertake “an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to
be addressed,” by proposing significant issues, and then taking public comment on these proposed issues at a stage called “scoping.”162
The agency then issues a provisional document for purposes of public
comment, a draft environmental impact statement (“EIS”). This document
begins by stating the “underlying purpose and need” for the proposed action;163 it then defines a range of reasonable alternatives that would meet
this purpose and need, including its preferred proposed action and a noaction alternative. The statement provides a comparative analysis of the alternatives, providing “full and fair discussion” with respect to each of the
parameters or subject matters defined in the scoping process,164 “sharply
defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options.”165
After publishing the draft EIS, the agency must solicit comment from agencies and the public.166 The agency then finalizes the document, responding
to comments by modifying alternatives in the EIS, developing new unconsidered alternatives, modifying its analysis, or explaining why comments do
not warrant further agency response.167 The agency promulgates its final
rule via a record of decision, stating its policy and identifying all alternatives considered. It must also explain whether all practicable means to mini159.
Dan O’Neill, Project Chariot: How Alaska Escaped Nuclear Excavation, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Sept. 2015, at 28, 28 (“Chariot was possibly the first government project challenged on ecological grounds, and occasioned the first integrated bioenvironmental study—
the progenitor of the modern environmental impact statement.”).
160.
40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2017).
161.
Id. § 1508.13.
162.
Id. § 1501.7.
163.
Id. § 1502.13.
164.
Id. § 1502.1.
165.
Id. § 1502.14.
166.
Id. § 1503.1(1), (4).
167.
Id. § 1503.4.
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mize environmental harms were adopted, and if not, the justifications for its
decision.168
While NEPA’s statutory language describes substantive policy goals,
under courts’ interpretations “its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”169 The Section 102 procedural requirements—for a preliminary
determination of significant impacts and the subsequent preparation of an
EIS—have been described as “action-forcing” in the sense that they necessitate that “the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts,” and also “guarantees that the relevant information will be made
available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decision-making process and the implementation of that decision.”170

2. Decentralized Enforcement
The bite of the statute comes from its decentralized enforcement.
NEPA includes no provision for judicial review,171 and therefore its procedural safeguards can only be enforced via the APA’s judicial review provisions.172 The requirements can be—and routinely are—enforced by lawsuits,
at an average of around 130 cases a year.173 A rich body of case law has
168.
Id. § 1502.2(d).
169.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.”). Some scholars argue that this exclusively procedural interpretation is unduly narrow.
See, e.g., Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990).
170.
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
171.
Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1515 (2012) [hereinafter Lazarus, NEPA] (“What was noticeably missing from NEPA’s language, however, was any suggestion that its mandate was subject to judicial enforcement through litigation. NEPA contains
no hint of such an enforcement mechanism in either the language of the law or its accompanying legislative history.”).
172.
Some scholars argue that the prominent role that judicial review and NEPA litigation play in the overall NEPA regime resulted from the path-breaking decision by Judge
Skelly Wright in the Calvert Cliffs decision. See, e.g., Lazarus, NEPA, supra note 171, at 151518. Sunstein and Vermeule discuss and quote from Judge Skelly Wright’s Calvert Cliffs opinion as a paradigmatic instance of “progressive administrative law.” Sunstein & Vermeule,
Libertarian, supra note 26, at 394-95.
173.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-370, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 20 (2014) (“In 2011, the most recent data
available, CEQ reported 94 NEPA cases filed, down from the average of 129 cases filed per
year from calendar year 2001 through calendar year 2008. . . . [T]he number of NEPA
lawsuits is relatively small when compared with the total number of NEPA analyses.”).
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developed in the federal courts174 regarding how agencies must comply with
NEPA procedures. Here, civil society plays an important role, since organized and frequent litigation have given NEPA its teeth175: “litigation and—
far more often—the threat of litigation, nip[ ] at the heels of federal decision-making, surfacing greener alternatives.”176

3. NEPA’s Success: “Making Bureaucracies Think”
NEPA has been largely successful in changing agency behavior and
generating improved environmental protection.
NEPA processes come with costs177: an EIS costs between $250,000
and $2 million to complete.178 Analysis also takes time and can generate
voluminous information, which may create its own epistemic bottlenecks.179
For this reason, critics contend that “EISs are . . . too thorough, overstuffed
to the point of uselessness.”180
But costs must be assessed relative to benefits. NEPA has “had a massive impact on governmental decision-making.”181 Even critics of “ossified”
administration concede that the NEPA regime has improved regulatory
174.
Notably, however, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to rule against the federal
agencies on NEPA claims. See generally Lazarus, NEPA, supra note 171, at 1521.
175.
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
59, 72 (1992) (“[E]nvironmental groups play a crucial role. Since early in the emergence of
modern environmental law, these groups have been the major sources of litigation on behalf
of environmental quality.”).
176.
Houck, supra note 157, at 188 (“NEPA lives on in agency practice and in litigation
and—far more often—in the threat of litigation, nipping at the heels of federal decisionmaking, surfacing greener alternatives, employing its own cadre in every federal agency, and
providing access for thousands of individuals and community groups who count on the impact statement process to give them notice and a fighting chance.”).
177.
Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1668, 1712 (1993) (discussing the NEPA regime’s “built-in difficulties that might
loosely be lumped together as problems of manageability”).
178.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, GAO-14-370,
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 12 (2014).
179.
Herz, supra note 177, at 1713 (“Herbert Simon, the guru of ‘bounded rationality,’
has suggested that one important boundary on rationality is simply limited attention. The
sprawling, unfocused, thousand-page EIS with twenty-eight appendices might be Simon’s
Exhibit A.”).
180.
Id. (emphasis omitted from original).
181.
Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77 (2001); see also Lazarus, NEPA, supra note 171, at 1519 (“[T]he process of
preparing EISs can itself change agency behavior. It is one thing to resist expending resources to acquire information about adverse environmental impacts. It is quite another to
ignore such information once it is available and part of the decision-making record. It is the
rare government official who would do the latter . . . .”).
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output.182 “Projects that make it through the NEPA process are financially
and environmentally improved,” allowing agencies to “avoid the multiyear
cost of mitigating a project’s potential adverse effects up front.”183 NEPA’s
procedures “are almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision.”184
This is because, as expressed by Serge Taylor’s famous analysis of NEPA’s
effects on the Army Corps of Engineers and the Forest Service,185 the regime has made bureaucracies think: the process of environmental impact analysis has resulted in better informed agency decisions,186 and has forced
agencies to develop in-house sensitivity specifically on the environmental
impacts of regulated conduct.187 The mere anticipation of NEPA analysis,
and the knowledge that decisions can be scrutinized by the public and possibly the courts, has disciplined agency practice.188
182.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN . L. REV.
59, 68 (1995) (“The duty to consider the environmental effects of agency actions, imposed in
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, seems to have had this type of broad beneficial effect. This potential culture-changing effect of the duty to engage in reasoned decision
making may have enough value to justify retention of some version of the judicially enforced
duty notwithstanding the doctrine’s high costs.”).
183.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-370, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 17 (2014); see also LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMEN TATION 28 (2008) (“Some agency representatives feel that the NEPA process, when
implemented as required by the CEQ regulations, actually facilitates a more efficiently executed project.”).
184.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). See also
ENVTL. LAW INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT (2010).
185.
See generally TAYLOR, supra note 6.
186.
Lazarus, NEPA, supra note 171, at 1519 (“NEPA also had the effect of prompting
agencies to change the background and expertise of those hired and appointed to include
agency personnel more knowledgeable about environmental impact.”).
187.
Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 689 n.364 (1986)
(“[U]ndoubtedly one of NEPA’s most significant long-term impacts has been the hiring by
agencies of personnel with expertise in the environmental area and, consequently, personnel
usually sensitive to environmental concerns.”); Herz, supra note 177, at 1711-12 (“One result
of NEPA’s enactment has been the large growth of environmental professionals within agencies, including many whose basic mission has nothing to do with environmental protection.”); see generally TAYLOR, supra note 6; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 65 (1989) (citing reforms undertaken following NEPA, and concluding “[e]ven established bureaucracies with strong professional traditions already in place can be altered by inserting a new profession”).
188.
Lazarus, NEPA, supra note 171, at 1519; see also Houck, supra note 157, at 190-91
(“NEPA’s great contribution . . . is the environmental impact statement. It is not what the
statement says that is important. It is in what comes before, in what agencies have to investigate and learn and listen to, in what they have to fear from other agencies and from environmental groups, the press, and reviewing courts, and in the everyday responses and
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Additionally, NEPA has induced agencies to invest in and accumulate
environmental expertise, yielding better policy at lower informational costs.
Outside of the agencies, NEPA provides civic interests—citizens organizations, NGOs, public interest groups—an institutional framework around
which to organize: scientists, lawyers, civil society organizations and regulated industry have developed practices to mobilize for and against administrative action.189
The NEPA regime provides an example of administrative reform that
seeks to improve regulatory output by rendering the bureaucracy’s decision
making more accessible and transparent. NEPA does not directly address
the epistemic critique of bureaucracy; the statute has nothing to say about
whether there should be bureaucratic action in the first place. However,
where centralized coordination is undertaken, the regime provides powerful
tools to mitigate the knowledge problem and correct misaligned incentives.
NEPA turns the bureaucracy’s synoptic view to concerns that would otherwise go unconsidered. The statute compels analysis while preserving the
agency’s flexibility with respect to substantive decisions. Simultaneously,
outside the government, civil society has the opportunity to intervene, participate, and enforce. The regime has thus been successful in advancing environmental protection. In short, the NEPA regime demonstrates that
process can reform the bureaucracy.190

IV. MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK DISTRIBUTIVELY
Insights from the environmental republican moment can be adapted to
address the legitimacy crisis of the administrative state today. Specifically,
the NEPA approach can direct the government to prioritize and address
contemporary populism’s animating source: American society’s slippage into
oligarchic levels of inequality. Currently, the administrative state does not
consistently engage in adequate processes of distributional analysis. The following section advances a proposal for legislative application of the NEPA
accommodations that they have to make.”); NEPA Litigation: The Causes, Effects and Solutions:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Hon. Tom Udall,
Member, H Comm. On Res.) (“[I]n more than 99 percent of those cases where an agency is
taking major federal action, NEPA serves to avoid a court fight. Through collaboration,
extensive public involvement and thorough analysis, NEPA inoculates the vast majority of
agency plans from legal challenge.”).
189.
LYNTON K. CALDWELL, SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: REDIRECTING POLICY THROUGH PROCEDURAL REFORM 110-13 (1982); Houck, supra note 157, at 188
(describing the “APA-like enfranchising power that this statute has brought to the (one million? easily more) Americans who have participated in the NEPA process over the past thirty
years, as well as the effect of this power on the federal establishment.”).
190.
Herz, supra note 177, at 1698.
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approach to the problem of distributive inequity, and describes potential
implications for regulatory policy.

A. The Need for Distributional Analysis
The administrative state still lacks adequate processes for distributional
analysis of regulatory output, despite the acknowledged importance of distributional impacts.

1. Distributional Analysis in Environmental Law
Distributional analysis of regulatory action occurs in environmental law,
though it is not comprehensive. On its face, NEPA mandates review of all
impacts to the human environment. Despite NEPA’s broad language, however, courts have confined its application to environmental considerations
narrowly conceived.191
Environmental regulators have some limited tools to address inequities
in environmental policy. An executive order issued by President Clinton in
1994 requires limited distributional regulatory analysis with respect to “environmental justice.”192 Under the order, federal agencies must “make
achieving environmental justice part of [their] mission” by identifying the
effects of agency action on “minority populations and low-income populations”193 and “address[ing] disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities” on
these populations.194
But the ability of the regulatory state to address distributions of wealth
and power via environmental policy alone is limited, since “[t]he distributional inequities that appear to exist in environmental protection are undoubtedly the product of broader social forces.”195
191.
Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 778 (1983)
(“If a harm does not have a sufficiently close connection to the physical environment, NEPA
does not apply.”). There have been proposals to include distributional “environmental justice” analysis in federal environmental policymaking, including proposed legislation in the
102d Congress. See Richard Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 787, 843 & n.255 (1993) [hereinafter
Lazarus, Pursuing] (explaining and advocating these proposals). Lazarus seems to have concluded that a better approach was to resurrect existing statutory and regulatory language “to
infuse environmental justice concerns” into environmental rulemaking. Richard J. Lazarus,
Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 717-22 (1997).
192.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
193.
Id. at § 1-101.
194.
Id. at § 1-103(a).
195.
Lazarus, Pursuing, supra note 191, at 825.
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2. Distributional Analysis in the Cost-Benefit State
Under existing presidential directives, agencies are supposed to consider distributive impacts when undertaking regulatory action, but existing
mechanisms of review are inadequate.
Under executive orders issued by Presidents Clinton and Obama, agencies are directed to consider distributive impacts of regulatory action in the
course of regulatory cost-benefit analysis. Both Clinton’s Executive Order
12,866196 and Obama’s Executive Order 13,563197 authorize consideration of
distributional impacts in OIRA review. Executive Order 12,866 includes
among its “Regulatory Philosophy and Principles” a directive that “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including . . . distributive impacts;
and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.”198
Obama’s Order 13,563 retains Clinton’s directive,199 advising that agencies
“may” “[w]here appropriate” consider distributive impacts.200 The administrative state has had difficulty integrating these directives for distributive
impacts review.
In practice, distributional impacts are not examined adequately.201
Agencies often include pro forma distributional analyses or simply state,
196.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“[A]gencies should
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives”).
197.
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011); Obama’s OIRA
further extended the reach of the CBA process, adding “retrospective analysis of rules that
may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome.” Id.; see also Sunstein,
Most Knowledgeable, supra note 12, at 1607, 1636 n.86, 1648.
198.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, at § 1(a) (Oct. 4, 1993).
199.
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, at § 1(b) (2012).
200.
Id. at § 1(c).
201.
Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1408 (2003)
(“Single-rule analyses are able, in principle at least, to take account of the distributive impacts. Indeed, widely agreed canons of cost-benefit analysis call on analysts to examine such
impacts wherever they are significant—though actual examples of this happening are rather
hard to find.”); Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 (2012)
(“How are distributional fairness issues addressed in risk regulation? Despite repeated calls
for a clear process of distributional analysis, implementation remains haphazard, and no
dominant approach has emerged. Under Executive Order 12866, which was the primary
order governing regulatory analysis for many years, distributional impacts were incorporated
into regulatory analyses only with a breezy exhortation to count ‘distributive impacts’ and
‘equity’ in with other ‘benefits.’ . . . The Obama administration’s response to this critique
has been to include a separate provision in Executive Order 13563 explicitly permitting
distributional concerns—and other difficult-to-quantify values—to be considered . . . . agencies have yet to determine the best way to operationalize it.”); Richard Williams & James
Broughel, Principles for Analyzing Distribution in Regulatory Impact Analysis, MERCATUS ON POL’Y ,
May 2015, at 1 (“With the exception of the legally required analysis for small entities (called
regulatory flexibility analysis), agencies rarely conduct a general distributional analysis of the
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without showing, that they have analyzed distributional impacts.202 A study
found that “federal agencies largely ignore” the orders’ guidance regarding
distributional impact analysis.203 Where distributional analysis of regulation
does occur, agencies restrict their review to select groups of concern—for
example, children or racial minorities—and assess whether the regulation
imposes detriments on these groups.204 Agencies do not undertake comprehensive distributional analysis examining the ways both costs and benefits
are allocated across the entire spectrum of affected groups. One study attributes the omission to bureaucratic disincentives to generate information
that could sustain political pushback or “cause new groups to coalesce in
opposition to the regulation.”205
In theory, distributional impacts could be integrated directly into costbenefit analysis. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner have explained that costbenefit analysis could employ a social welfare function to account for the
declining marginal utility of income—that is, for an incremental dollar of
income resulting in less benefit to persons as they get wealthier.206 If analysis could be undertaken so as to weight cost and benefits for different income groups, distributive effects of a policy could be integrated directly
into cost-benefit analysis.207 Despite proposals to implement this idea in
practice, “[w]elfare economists have not proposed a practical way of determining the appropriate method of weighting” people’s marginal utilities of
income.208 In light of the current infeasibility of integrating distributional
analysis into cost-benefit analysis, where distributional analysis is pursued,
parties likely to receive benefits and bear costs.”); Lisa A. Robinson et al., Attention to Distribution in U.S. Regulatory Analyses, 10 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 308, 316 (2016).
202.
Robert W. Hahn et al., Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 405 (2003) (“In practice, agencies have responded to the two
EOs by including a separate distributional impact analysis within RIAs. Subsequent to EO
12,898, environmental justice was mentioned in RIAs for rules in which agencies were required to address the issue, but only infrequently was quantitative analysis included. In no
case did the Administration’s explicit concern for equity clearly alter proposed policies.”).
203.
Robinson et al., supra note 201, at 316.
204.
Id. at 318.
205.
Id. at 320-21.
206.
Id. at 320; cf. Weisbach, supra note 140, at 440 (“[I]ndividuals have declining marginal utility of income. All this means is that as individuals get wealthier, each dollar is less
important. One reason that individuals might have declining marginal utility of income is
simply that individuals tend to satisfy their most important needs first.”); Parker, supra note
201, at 1407.
207.
Robinson et al., supra note 201, at 320.
208.
MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
23-24 (2006); see also Michael A. Livermore & Jason A. Schwartz, Analysis to Inform Public
Discourse on Jobs and Regulation, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 250 (Cary Coglianese, Adam
M. Finkel & Christopher Carrigan, eds., 2013).
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it occurs as a second-step, supplemental, qualitative consideration.209 Admittedly, “estimating the appropriate weights for marginal utility can be
challenging.”210 But even if distributional analysis were feasible and practicably integrated into cost-benefit analysis, there would be the remaining
concern of enforcement. Both the Clinton and Obama executive orders explicitly insulate regulatory impact analysis from judicial review.211 There
may be a movement within the courts to subject cost-benefit analyses to
judicial review under the APA, but at present, review is limited to circumstances where Congress has directed the agency to conduct the analysis.212
To summarize, in the absence of a legislative mandate—analogous to
NEPA—the federal bureaucracy will not undertake comprehensive distributional analysis within extant processes of regulatory review.

3. The Imperative of Distributional Analysis
Where regulations are evaluated on the basis of efficiency, it is all the
more important to ensure that there is also an adequate distributional
analysis.
Efficiency is an important attribute, and in some cases is a precondition
of regulatory action in the administrative state. Efficiency is not the ends of
government; it does not predetermine the subjects of regulation or define
the substantive direction of regulation. But it is a criterion against which
regulatory output can be and is judged. One of the main tasks of the White
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is to rationalize regulatory output on the basis of efficiency—that is, to determine when
a regulation’s benefits exceed its costs. Though the practice has a longer
209.
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 74 (1995) (“A third possible approach, also making sense of some of the ambiguities in the Clinton Order, would be an explicitly two-stage decision process. The first stage
should consist of a cost-benefit analysis, limited to the kinds of costs and benefits that can
reasonably be quantified. This first stage will generate valuable information that can be used
for many purposes, including threshold comparisons of policies in different risk-regulating
areas. In a second stage, decision makers should explicitly address and articulate the other
values, if any are relevant, that the CBA cannot take into account. These may include the
equitable and distributional considerations referred to directly in Executive Order 12866, as
well as the conflicts between expert and lay valuations and concerns for expressive issues we
have discussed here. Through this two-stage process, both the benefits of CBA and its limitations can be recognized.”).
210.
Robinson et al., supra note 201, at 320; see also ADLER & POSNER, supra note 208, at
23-24.
211.
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, at § 10 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec.
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, at § 7(d) (Jan. 21, 2011).
212.
See generally Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost
Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Arbitrariness Review, (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 16-12, 2016).
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history, cost-benefit analysis rose to prominence in the Reagan Administration.213 The use of cost-benefit analysis was consolidated when Democrats
took the White House under Bill Clinton,214 and was further refined a decade and a half later by President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563.215 By the
end of the Clinton Administration the federal government had already become a cost-benefit state.216
Regulatory cost-benefit analysis occurs with the implicit goal of achieving or pursuing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.217 A Kaldor-Hicks efficient transaction is one that generates sufficient benefits for regulatory “winners”
(those who benefit from a regulatory action) to make a transfer to compensate the regulatory “losers” (those who bear its costs), potentially leaving no
one worse off, and at least some better off.218 In such a scenario, the hypothetical compensatory transfer would render the transaction Pareto superior
(at least one person is better off, and no person is worse off).219 But to be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, a transaction does not require actual compensation;
it only requires that such compensation is possible. For this reason, it is
sometimes referred to as the “potential Pareto superiority” standard.220
213.
See, e.g. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, at 13,194 (Feb. 19, 1981);
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986); Kagan, supra note 71, at 2277 (“The sea change began
with Ronald Reagan’s inauguration.”).
214.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, at § 1(a) (Oct. 4, 1993) (“[A]gencies
should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives”).
215.
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011); Obama’s OIRA
further extended the reach of the CBA process, adding “retrospective analysis of rules that
may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome.” Id.
216.
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST BENEFIT STATE, at ix (2002) (“Gradually, and in fits and
starts, the American government is becoming a cost-benefit state. By this I mean that government regulation is increasingly assessed by asking whether the benefits of regulation justify the costs of regulation.”).
217.
See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 208, at 21-23. Strictly speaking, it only approximates Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, since analysis is conducted in monetary terms. Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L. REV. 385, 435 n.178 (2004).
218.
Allan Feldman, Kaldor-Hicks Compensation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE L AW 417–21 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also Gordon Tullock, Two Kinds of
Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 659, 663-64 (1980) (“[T]here may be changes in the law
that benefit some yet directly injure others. . . . Another simple way of lowering the cost to
those injured is to compensate them. . . . If a law must necessarily injure some group of
people, then the calculation is whether the benefits are great enough so that in theory those
injured could be compensated. If so, then there is an improvement in efficiency, even though
it will injure these people.”).
219.
See Tullock, supra note 218, at 663-64.
220.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
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Where a regulation is efficient, regulators generally avoid making offsetting compensatory transfers via the regulation itself (i.e., by including a
compensation scheme within a regulation). Offsetting transfers via the regulation itself usually would be less efficient than making the same transfer
via the tax system221: redistribution as such distorts incentives associated
with labor (at the margins, transferees will experience reduced incentives to
seek income from work relative to a world without transfers); but tinkering
with an otherwise unrelated regulation to bring about redistribution “affects
two margins: the decision to work and the decisions relevant to the [regulation].”222 Moreover, compensation by means of the tax system would likely
have lower incremental administrative costs,223 and would allow for broader
redistributive policies (i.e. compensating regulatory net losers as defined
from the totality of federal regulation, as opposed to piecemeal and potentially cross-cutting transfers made with respect to individuated regulatory
actions).224 Redistribution through taxation also allows for the compensatory decision to occur with higher visibility, mitigating risks of rent-seeking.225 Therefore, many efficient policies will not include immediate
redistribution to compensate regulatory losers.
The prioritization of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency rules makes a great deal
of sense, but only if compensation actually occurs at some point. But in
many cases there may be reason to doubt that it will. As with any reciprocal
arrangement that unfolds over time, the incentives for parties to commit to
the arrangement ex ante are dissipated as soon as agreement has been elicited. A time inconsistency problem, in which parties must be held ex post to
their ex ante commitments, is precisely why in the domain of private transactions societies have developed contract law to guarantee performance (or
its equivalent), by force if necessary.226 But no analog to contract enforce221.
Tullock, supra note 218, at 660-61; Livermore & Schwartz, supra note 208, at 25051; see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. L EGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994).
222.
Weisbach, supra note 140, at 446-47; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 221, at 677.
223.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 221, at 675 n.12.
224.
See Weisbach, supra note 140, at 449 (describing the haphazardness problem);
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 221, at 675.
225.
Tullock, supra note 218, at 661 (“[W]hen one begins this indirect and covert type of
egalitarian behavior, it is likely that other people will take advantage of it. The net effect is
that some special interest group will get significant benefits and the poor will receive little or
none.”).
226.
See THOMAS HOBBES, L EVIATHAN 105 (1929) (“[H]e that perform[s] first, has no
assurance the other will perform[ ] after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
mens [sic] ambition, avarice, anger and other [p]assions, without the fear[ ] of some coercive
power . . . . [W]here there is a [p]ower set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate
their faith, that fear[ ] is no more reasonable”); Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to
Social Welfare: Theoretical Principles and Practical Applications, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1753
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ment exists to ensure that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is eventually converted
to Pareto superiority in the regulatory context.227 For example, no agency
has authority to bind parties to compensatory arrangements, even though
they routinely make Kaldor-Hicks-efficient regulatory policy choices.228
The authority to order transfers resides in the legislature, via its control of
the tax code. But tax transfers to distribute slices of a now bigger pie may
never occur. It may be exceedingly difficult to identify who has incurred
costs, even when regulators are confident costs exist.229 More likely, deferral of compensation is justified by the high transaction costs of redistributive regulation, but only by ignoring high political costs and frictions
associated with a subsequent transfer by tax.230 Once these costs are taken
into account, the tax-and-transfer compensation method may be the less
efficient choice.231 Moreover, tax policy itself may be justified on KaldorHicks efficiency terms (i.e. the tax system would be designed to “maximize
the pie”), leading to interminable deferrals of redistributive compensation,
which for all intents and purposes may never occur. In such a context, the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency gains may be irrelevant.232
(2015) (“[T]his enforcement element is critical, for without it the only kind of agreements
that work are those that call for (near) simultaneous performance . . . . No one will go first
unless he is assured that the second party will keep his promise when the time comes.”);
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 220, at 81 (citing Hobbes).
227.
The welfare implications of trade, as justified on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency terms,
and redistributive policy have been discussed with respect to trade. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik,
Too Late to Compensate Free Trade’s Losers, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.pro
ject-syndicate.org/commentary/free-trade-losers-compensation-too-late-by-dani-rodrik-201704?barrier=accessreg; Pol Antràs et al., Globalization, Inequality and Welfare, 108 J. INT’L ECON.
387 (2017).
228.
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 208, at 144 (“We know of no agency in the U.S. government that has the authority to order wealth transfers, and there are many good reasons for
denying agencies this authority.”). This absence of congressional directive is probably for
good reason: authorizing agencies to order offsetting wealth transfers would lead to administrative chaos and rent-seeking.
229.
Tullock, supra note 218, at 664 n.12 (“Ideally, the cost of the compensation should
be paid by the people who gain from the change in law. In practice this will be difficult or
impossible to arrange in many cases. . . . [I]t should be emphasized that we are unlikely to be
able to exactly measure the cost and hence the compensation will be approximate at best.”).
230.
Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and
Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2016) (“It is plausible that the presence of political
action costs would necessitate second-best methods of governmental redistribution”); Weisbach, supra note 140, at 451-52 (“[T]hat adjustments to the tax system are not feasible . . . is
correct to some extent. . . . If our only alternative is legal rules, we may want to use them.
But there is no particular reason to believe that legal rules will be more available than
taxes.”).
231.
See id.
232.
See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 208, at 145.
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Distributive analysis can help in this situation. Distributive analysis
would not substitute for an enforcing “leviathan”233—policy makers could
still tout a policy’s efficiency ex ante, only to renege on compensatory transfers once it is adopted. But distributive analysis could identify precisely
where compensatory transfers would be due; such a step would significantly
increase the political costs of reneging. Regulatory losers would be able to
keep tabs on the sum of hypothetical Kaldor-Hicks efficient transfers they
were “owed.” Citizens and politicians would be able to monitor cost-benefit
allocations that were “due” among different social and demographic
groups.234 With interests now well-defined and visible, there would be an
opportunity for regulatory losers to organize, and express themselves politically as a countervailing force against incumbent regulatory winners—ideally cancelling out incentives of any socially wasteful lobbying. The political
price of imposing costs against one group while lavishing benefits on another could be high.
Pressure could mount on the Executive to employ the levers of presidential administration to pursue socially beneficial regulatory policies not
only in the conventionally economic areas, but in areas of public health,
environmental regulation, and more. Distributive review could also create
pressure on the Executive to present its regulatory policy accurately. Pressure would also affect Congress. As the branch empowered to impose and
modify budgets and tax policy regimes, Congress would bear the duty to
transform efficient policies into Pareto superior ones: it could directly make
compensatory transfers to regulatory cost-bearers or instruct agencies to
make such transfers. Distributional analysis of regulatory output would indirectly generate pressure on Congress to correct statutory directives where
regulation produced disproportionate benefits to narrow interest groups.
The following section considers how the administrative state could
adopt a regime of distributive impacts review.

B. The Distributive Impacts Review Act
This section proposes a statute, the Distributive Impacts Review Act,
which would establish a procedural regime in which agencies are required to
review an action’s distributional effects as part of rulemaking.235 By legislat233.
See HOBBES, supra note 226.
234.
Cf. Teles, Scourge, supra note 24, at 93 (recommending that “OMB . . . add some
form of distributive analysis to the cost-benefit analyses it requires for regulations, which
would highlight cases where new rules would enrich already powerful interests.”) But see
supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text (discussing existing OMB distributional analysis
and this inadequacies).
235.
The closest mention I have seen to a NEPA-like approach to distribution features
in Serge Taylor’s mention in an endnote of conversation with “a staffer at the Congressional
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ing against the background of NEPA (and NEPA case law developed over
the past 49 years), Congress could relatively easily draw upon an existing
legal framework to establish a regime of distributive impacts review.

1. The Proposal: Action-Forcing Distributional Analysis
A hypothetical Distributive Impacts Review Act could establish a multistage review process for regulatory actions.
Initially, the Distributive Impacts Review Act would require agencies to
determine whether a contemplated agency action had potentially significant
distributive impacts, meaning that the absolute value of costs and benefits
generated by the law exceeded a certain threshold, say $100 million. Paralleling NEPA’s EA process, the agency would conduct a preliminary costbenefit analysis, subject to notice and comment, and issue a resulting “distributional assessment” (DA) document that presents the absolute value of
costs and benefits. Where the threshold was not met, the agency would also
issue a finding of no significant impact, and distributive analysis would end
there.
Where, however, the preliminary assessment concluded that potential
impacts cleared the significance threshold, the statute would require preparation of a distributive impact statement (“DIS”), paralleling NEPA’s EIS
process. The agency would first issue a draft DIS. The document would
describe the action’s purpose and need; it would define a range of reasonable alternatives.236 The agency would analyze each alternative, monetizing
the costs and benefits of each (already done for the preferred alternative in
the DA process) and thus evaluating its efficiency. It would then identify
the likely allocation of these costs and benefits, defining allocatee groups by
geography, income, wealth, industrial sectors, racial and gender categories,
and whichever other demographic groups were relevant to those particular
costs and benefits. The agency would be required to give a reasoned evaluation of the distribution of costs and benefits. Lastly, the agency would define the confidence associated with economic projections, explicitly
identifying uncertainties involved in defining costs, benefits, and their
distribution.
Research Service” who listed distributional impacts as one of 30 to 40 areas in which there
had been proposals “bear[ing] a family resemblance to the environmental impact statement
concept.” See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 395 n.10. Similar in concept, though not in application
nor in result, Michael Herz proposes a thought experiment “remak[ing] procedural due process doctrine in NEPA’s image,” forcing preparation of an EIS-like impact analysis for the
determining of individualized welfare entitlements. Herz, supra note 177, at 1718, 1723-24.
236.
This section would be identical to the corresponding section in an EIS, if the
agency had to prepare such for the same action.
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The DIS would consider cumulative impacts as well as impacts from
connected actions. These would include the anticipated effects of other major rules and legislative programs. The scope of review would ensure that
allocations of costs and benefits to a group were viewed in the context of
the net allocations of other governmental interventions. The agency could
be required provisionally to identify how compensatory modifications in the
tax code or other legislative measures could offset distributional impacts of
the regulation.
Notice of each draft assessment and statement would be published in
the Federal Register, commencing a public comment period. Potential allocatees would have incentives to participate. Specifically, each group would
be motivated to clarify the magnitude of the cost or benefit allocated to it,
and to share data that would help the agency refine its estimate. As a result
of the comment period, the agency’s understanding of quantified costs and
benefits as well as their distribution across groups could change. Following
the comment period, the agency would respond to comments in a final DIS.
Informed by exchanges during the comment period, and distributional impacts in its decision, the agency would ultimately choose a policy from
within the range of considered alternatives within the DIS and publish notice of this decision in a record of decision.
The statute would make its procedural requirements enforceable via judicial review under the APA “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Judicial
review would be confined to procedural claims, meaning that parties could
challenge the adequacy of the agency’s analysis and consideration of impacts. Analysis would not be judged against the actions’ actual distributional
effects as measured ex post. However, the agency would be required to have
considered distributive impacts ex ante and to justify its decision.

2. Procedure without a Decision Rule
Distributive impacts analysis would be action-forcing as to procedure,
but would provide no decision rule (e.g., mandating that all regulatory decisions achieve Pareto superiority). The restriction to procedural measures
would be important for at least three reasons.
First, there are compelling policy reasons (e.g., moral or civic republican ones) to avoid a rigid decision rule requiring compensatory transfers to
convert all rules to Pareto superiority, i.e. to include compensatory transfers
to regulatory losers. Some agency actions might be intentionally and desirably redistributive in that they are remedying some past inequitable government allocation of costs. Take for example regulatory actions taken pursuant
to the large environmental statutes: studies show that these actions overwhelmingly redistribute value (i.e. monetized benefits, less costs) from rich
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to poor demographic groups, often by cleaning an environment in which
poorer Americans live with tax dollars disproportionately provided by the
rich. If such actions were subjected to a decision rule mandating a compensatory transfer, the result would be either a tax transfer from the poorest
members of society to the more affluent, or more likely an effective bar on
such regulatory actions (poor individuals likely lack means to make such
transfers).237 Actions desirable for moral or civic-republican reasons might
be foreclosed by a strict Pareto-superiority decision rule.
Second, even where compensatory transfers are desirable, arguments
against regulatory action as the vehicle for such transfers have merit. Direct
administrative redistributions might not be permissible as a legal matter, for
example, where transfers are beyond the remit of the agency’s statutory
directive.238 Even where lawful, transfers are often better made via the tax
system. Besides the usual efficiency arguments,239 a redistributive transfer
via tax policy could aggregate the necessary compensatory transfers associated with multiple agency actions. Congress would be able to benefit from
logistical economies in making the transfer and the administrative state
would avoid a wasteful series of “kludges” required to shift compensation
among the winners and losers under particular regulations.240
Third, perhaps most important, distributional analysis will often be
subject to inherent uncertainties, and might not be conclusive, making a
rigid redistributive decision rule a clumsy solution. Public participation in
distributional analysis of an agency proposal would help to mitigate the
knowledge problem; however, it cannot eliminate the bureaucracy’s epistemic bounds. The reason for this inability has been described above: the
bureaucracy is incapable of aggregating sufficient information to make precise determinations of how individuals will be directly and indirectly affected by an action.241 Therefore, agencies should retain discretion not to
act where information is insufficient to justify action.
For these reasons, distributive impact analysis as an action-forcing procedure is superior to a redistributive decision rule.
237.
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 209, at 46 (“Actual willingness to pay in real market
settings—the typical criterion for calculating costs and benefits—depends on ability to pay,
and in this sense it can incorporate a kind of bias against the poor.”).
238.
Such ultra vires transfers would be vulnerable to challenge under the APA as
agency actions arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to law or under a constitutional
argument depending on what mechanism the agency used to allocate monies to the regulatory losers and draw contributions from regulatory winners.
239.
See supra at notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
240.
Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, 17 NAT’L AFF. 97 (2013).
241.
For an overview of this argument, applying the Hayekian epistemic critique to lawand-economics approach to private law, see Edward Stringham, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and
the Problem of Central Planning, 4 Q.J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 41, 41-50 (2001).
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C. Effects of Action-Forcing Distributional Analysis
The distributive impacts review process would address the two fundamental challenges inherent in bureaucratic governance: the knowledge problem and the incentives problem.

1. Addressing the Knowledge Problem
As a regime of procedural control, the proposed requirements define
how regulatory actions should take place, not whether and where administrative action is warranted. In this sense, it does not resolve the knowledge
problem, which is fundamentally about determining whether a given problem would benefit from centrally coordinated regulatory intervention.
Nonetheless, the distributive impacts review process would address a
second-order knowledge problem once the decision had been taken to regulate. Like NEPA’s enhancement of the APA’s notice-and-comment process
in the environmental context, the distributive impacts review process would
mitigate the epistemic limitations inherent in centrally coordinated
agency.242 Because the projection of costs and benefits is a prerequisite to
the evaluation of how these values are allocated across the population, the
distributive impacts review process would effectively introduce a detailed
cost-benefit analysis into the APA rulemaking process, subjecting it to public scrutiny. The would-be allocatees of an action’s costs and benefits would
be able to share information, data, and arguments to inform or challenge the
agency’s projections in a proposed rule. Assumptions could be questioned,
data refined. Judicial review could follow.
The process would incur costs. But as with NEPA, the distributive impacts review process would also improve the agencies’ distributional knowledge. The prospect of laboriously reworking faulty analysis in response to
public comments—with the threat of judicial review at the back end—would
discipline agencies, leading them proactively to aggregate information. Currently, agencies may lack the data necessary to conduct distributional analysis of regulation.243 But repeated preparation of submissions and responses
would induce the agencies to develop expertise on the distributional impacts of their actions, and as a prerequisite to this knowledge, a more detailed and comprehensive knowledge of the baseline distributive picture
involved in their area of regulation.

242.
243.

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Robinson et al., supra note 201, at 322.
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2. Addressing the Incentives Problem
In general, the distributive impacts review process would reduce the
informational asymmetries from which the incentives problem arises. The
public would have one more locus for oversight of the agency’s activities.
This would also raise the costs of capture by increasing the risks of detection and expanding opportunities for review of agency reasoning.244
The process would also increase incentives for tightened political control, particularly from the presidency. The most obvious effect would be to
increase the political costs of policies that distribute costs to a majority of
the electorate while allocating benefits to narrow interest groups without
offsetting compensatory transfers. The transparency of the allocative
formula associated with regulation would likely create a disciplining pressure on members of Congress; but the brunt of the political pressure would
fall on the presidency.
By mandating distributive analysis, the law would effectively disclose
which interests were principally benefitted by agency decisions. Moreover,
because the distributional impact analysis would require contemplation of a
range of alternative policies, the spoils of special interests’ advocacy could
be viewed relative to a world without such advocacy; correlations between
industry’s investment in the rulemaking process and policy outcomes would
become more visible.245 It would also disclose at whose expense the regulation was promulgated. The organization of regulatory losers as such would
counteract the collective action problem that skewed policy in the first
place.246 Policies skewed in the rulemaking process could be identified, and,
if not changed in the rulemaking process, then nullified legislatively.
Ultimately, the process would generate more “paper” in the agencies.
But like NEPA,247 it would render agencies more accountable to the public
and more attentive to congressional directives.248
244.
Revesz and Livermore make a similar argument about OIRA’s cost-benefit analysis.
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?, in
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 420, 421
(Daniel Carpenter & Daniel A. Moss eds., 2014).
245.
Unless informational capture were so extensive that the DIS process would be completely co-opted towards proving the necessity of the final industry-favoring rule and the
impossibility of any other regulatory route.
246.
Cf. Teles, Scourge, supra note 24, at 88.
247.
See supra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
248.
It is interesting to consider how regulatory review provisions relate to concerns
over filter failure. Wendy Wagner does not mention the NEPA process as a source of filter
failures, except for a single reference to a CEQ report that indicating NEPA “cannot completely counteract filter failure.” Wagner, supra note 63, at 1394. Wagner states that centralized analysis “still might provide valuable mechanisms for the . . . high-level political officials
to gain purchase on regulatory issues and intervene more directly in ways that offset par-
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CONCLUSION
The contemporary political feasibility of a statute creating a distributional review requirement is a topic beyond the scope of this Article. But it
is worth highlighting that such a statute has much to recommend to potential legislative champions across the political spectrum.
The merits of the proposal are probably most immediately appealing to
legislators of a progressive egalitarian orientation. The DIS process would
bring distributive justice considerations to the fore of bureaucratic practice,
increasing the salience of distributive justice causes and the politicians who
champion them. Progressive egalitarian legislators would reap the reputational benefits of having introduced and championed a law that revolutionizes regulatory practice to consider the circumstances of the less well-off.
Information gathering from DIS analysis could generate valuable data for
progressive egalitarian legislative work and political mobilization. Perhaps
most importantly in the long term, forces in civil society could coalesce
around advocacy and litigation associated with distributional analysis, potentially creating organizations on which progressive political forces might
draw for support.
But many associated with the political right249 should also find much to
like in the Distributive Impacts Review Act. First, to the extent those of the
right organize around acceptance of Hayekian principles of social organization, they should embrace the proposal. The distributive impacts review
process would necessitate no particular decisions regarding what the government should regulate, a decision that should be made democratically,
hopefully informed by considerations of what the administrative state can
do efficaciously. Fiscal conservatives and the champions of efficient regulation should like this proposal: Distributional review would bring clarity to
the costs of government intervention and would test agency cost estimates
in the crucible of expert scrutiny and public comment—subject to the threat
of judicial review. While the review process would have administrative
costs, by clarifying the social benefits of particular policies, the process
would create pressure for the ex ante promises of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to
be converted into post facto Pareto superiority. Applied repeatedly over the
long run, the distributive impacts review process would build public confidence in the social benefits of efficient legal rules, with the net effect of
reducing the transaction costs for their adoption.
ticipatory imbalances arising from information capture,” especially where “this political
counter pressure . . . take[s] place in the light rather than outside public oversight . . . .”). Id.
249.
But see Steven Teles, How to Get to Liberaltarianism from the Left, NISKANEN CTR.
BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/get-liberaltarianism-left/.
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The importance of improving the administrative state should be shared
across the political spectrum. While the advocates of democratization—and
indeed the populists—are correct that there is great room for improvement,
the solution should be to build institutions that work. In the case of bureaucracy, the United States has decades of history and a wealth of experience.
Drawing on models that work, like NEPA, and directing them to the
problems that concern Americans, the administrative state can respond
without compromising the integrity of sound, efficacious, and efficient
government.

